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Summary findings
Lanjouw and his coauthors investigate the extent to  allows for economies of scale in consumption which
which Indonesia's poor benefit from public and private  weaken the link between poverty status and household
provisioning of education and health services. Drawing  size.
on multiple rounds of SUSENAS  household surveys, they  The authors also examine the incidence of changes in
document a reversal in the rate of decline in poverty and  government spending. They find that the marginal
a slowdown in social sector improvements resulting from  incidence of spending in both junior and senior
the economic crisis in the second half of the 1990s.  secondary schooling is more progressive than what static
Carrying out traditional  static benefit-incidence  analysis would suggest, consistent with "early capture"
analysis of public spending in education and health, the  by the non-poor of education spending. In the health
authors find patterns consistent with experience in other  sector marginal and average incidence analysis point to
countries: spending on primary education and primary  the same conclusion: the greatest benefit to the poor
health care tends to be pro-poor,  while spending on  would come from an increase in primary health care
higher education and hospitals is less obviously beneficial  spending.
to the poor. These conclusions are tempered once one
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Indonesia  has long featured  prominently  in debates  on economic  development. This is in part
due to size; Indonesia's  large population  (207 million)  ranks it among  the five most populous
in the world and the vast span of the archipelago  makes it among the largest in geographic
terms as well.  However,  from a development  perspective  Indonesia  has been particularly
remarkable  because  of the great progress  it has made, since independence,  in raising  average
incomes and human development  outcomes and in reducing poverty.  Then, in  1997/98
Indonesia,  along with other East Asian "tigers",  was hit by a series of monetary  shocks. All
of a  sudden economic crisis and political instability came to  pose real threats to  the
sustainability  of its development  course and have  even raised the  specter  of collapse.
This paper focuses on two  important dimensions of  Indonesia's development record:
education  and health.  We assess to what extent all segments of Indonesian  society have
shared in  the expansion of  educational achievements and the  improvement in  health
outcomes. In particular,  we investigate  the extent  to which the poor (defined  in terms of low
consumption  levels)  benefit from  public  and private  provisioning  of these essential  services.
The analysis draws, for a  large part, on the Susenas household surveys. These large
household surveys  have nationwide  coverage  and are fielded on a yearly  basis. Each year, a
Core questionnaire  is administered  to a large sample of households  (the 1998 survey covers
880,040  individuals).  This questionnaire  collects  basic social indicators  and also has a short
consumption  questionnaire.  About a third of the sample  also receives  a Module  questionnaire.
There are three Modules,  which rotate every  year. In 1995 and 1998  the health and education
Module were administered.  These  Modules  collect detailed  information  on household  health
and education  expenditures  as well as inpatient treatment. The analysis in this paper draws
mainly on the data from the Core questionnaires  from 1995 through 1998 as well as the
health and education  modules  of 1995  and 1998.
The plan of the paper is as follows. We start the next section with a brief  description  of
poverty  in Indonesia,  and an overview  of education  and health outcomes  in Indonesia.. This
assessment  of progress to date sets the scene for the subsequent  analysis.  The poverty lines
underpinning  the poverty measures  in this section  also allow us to construct  two altemative
regional price indices. We describe in this section how dimensions  of well-being  beyond
simply a  money-metric  measure of consumption  have informed our final selection of a
regional price index.  All subsequent analysis in this paper is based on a consumption
measure  of well-being  deflated  by this price  index.
Following  our review of economic  and human development  outcomes  in Indonesia,  we turn
in Section  3 to the interaction  between  incomes,  education  and health. Education  and health
have not only an important  intrinsic  value to people - contributing  directly  to the quality  and
duration  of their daily lives  - but also help to determine  income  levels, which in turn provide
further  means to raise living standards. Moreover,  there may be additional  indirect  linkages,
such as the contribution  of education  to health outcomes,  etc. We draw on recent research  to
provide  empirical  background  to recent debates on the interaction  of poverty,  education  and
health outcomes  in Indonesia.
2Having considered the  importance to  social welfare of  a  well-educated and  healthy
population,  we consider  in Section  4 why the government  might feel compelled  to intervene
in the social sectors to subsidize education and health prices.  We review the empirical
literature on the price elasticity of demand for education  and health in Indonesia,  and show
that without government  intervention  to keep prices  low, the poor in particular  are unlikely  to
achieve  the education  and health outcomes  which  are considered  socially  desirable.
We follow, in Section 5, with a brief description of education and health provision in
Indonesia,  and illustrate  that, indeed, the public sector has been the dominant actor in this
domain.
Section 6 presents the main results of the analysis. We produce a basic benefit-incidence
analysis of education  and health spending in Indonesia  aimed at determining  to what extent
government  spending  in education  and health  has actually  benefited  the poor. We distinguish
between three types of education services and two health services.  For all services we
distinguish between private and public facilities. In  education, we analyze the benefit
incidence  of primary  education,  junior secondary  and senior secondary  schools.  In health we
distinguish  between  primary health care and hospitals."'  We subject  our results to robustness
tests  according to  alternative assumptions about economies  of  scale  in  household
consumption. This latter issue is receiving  increased  attention  in the academic literature,  the
growing  concern  being that the implicit assumption  of no economies  of scale, underpinning
traditional  incidence  analysis,  could  lead to dangerously  misleading  conclusions.
We then document  both government  as well as private spending  across income groups. The
utilization  of public facilities  is contrasted  with the utilization  of private facilities offering  the
same type of services.  We note that households  incur expenses irrespective  of whether they
consume  services from public or private providers. We examine  the distribution of private
outlays  across  quintiles  and compare  this to the value of transfers  received.
Moving beyond the classic benefit incidence analysis, we probe an  important concern
regarding  the interpretation  of results from standard  analysis. Does the average incidence  of
public spending on education and health provide a reliable indicator  of the incidence of a
change in public spending?  We scrutinize the impact of public spending over time, by
comparing  the incidence  in the 1990s with the incidence  in the 1970s  and 1980s. We also
employ a recently proposed econometric approach to estimate the marginal incidence of
public spending and compare the results from this analysis to  those from the standard
approach.
Finally, in Section 7, we sum up the findings from the analysis and presents some policy
recommendation's.
2.  Poverty,  Education  and Health  Outcomes  in Indonesia
In this section we provide  an overview  of poverty education  and health in Indonesia.  We do
so by reviewing  long term and recent changes in poverty (section 2.1), health (section 2.2)
3and education (section  2.3) outcomes.  Indonesia  is a large country  and the national  patterns
do not necessarily  hold for each region.  For this reason we pay explicit attention  to regional
patterns  in our discussion.
2.1 Povertv
Trends in National Poverty
Until the onset of the East Asian financial  crisis, Indonesia  experienced  strong declines in
poverty.  Official statistics  report the percentage  of the population  living in poverty  dropping
steadily  from 40.1 in 1976,  to 28.6 in 1980,  to 17.4  in 1987,  to 15.1  in 1990,  to 13.7  in 1993
to  11.3 in  1996"'. The financial crisis, which started in  1997, left its mark on poverty.
Because  poverty statistics are only collected every three years, it is not yet possible to say
with great precision  what has been  the effect  of the crisis. However,  a comparison  of the 1996
and 1999 data indicates that poverty increased by about 8 percentage  points (Suryahadi,
Sumarto,  Suharso  and Pritchett,  1999)  between  these two years. The actual  effect of the crisis
may well have been larger because poverty is likely to have continued declining  between
1996  and 1997,  when the economy  was still in good  shape.  Using a series of different  surveys
fielded  between 1996  and 1999,  Suryahadi  et al try to trace the evolution  of poverty  over the
course of the crisis. Their findings are summarized  in Figure 1. From 1996 to October of
1997,  when the financial  crisis hit, poverty  fell by 3.1 percent  point. From that point in time,
poverty  increased  by about 11 percentage  points within  one year. There is little evidence  of a
consistent  trend beyond  August,  1998;  the current  picture  remains  quite unclear.
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Figure 1 Evolution  of poverty  over the course of the crisis (source Suryadi
etall, 1999)
Measurement Issues
Official poverty  statistics are based on regionally  deflated  per capita consumption  measures
collected through a  detailed consumption module. In this study we use the same basic
indicator of welfare but at times probe the sensitivity of results to variations in some of the
assumptions  it embodies. Two issues warrant particular attention. The first is the choice of
the regional price deflator.  We describe  below how we deflate our consumption  measures  to
take into account spatial price variation. A second issue is that the per capita consumption
measures  rule  out economies  of scale within  the household.  We will test the sensitivity  of the
results with respect  to this assumption  in the Section  6.
There is considerable  controversy  in Indonesia regarding the choice of poverty lines (see
Chesher, 1998).  The Government  of Indonesia  maintains a set of poverty  lines (two poverty
lines are calculated for each province, one urban and one rural).  These poverty lines are
intended to represent  the expenditure  needed to meet a daily nutritional  requirement  of 2100
calories per person per day plus an allowance for non-food. Applying these lines to the
consumption  measure collected in the 1996 SUSENAS (the most recent year for which
detailed consumption  figures are available) shows that 11 percent of the population can be
considered  poor. Independently,  the World Bank constructed a second set of poverty lines
5using the cost of basic needs method (Ravallion  and Bidani, 1994) for l990.? This set of
poverty lines (referred to as the "altemative" poverty lines), when updated to 1996 price
levels, shows 7 percent of the population  living in poverty.  The two methods  yield different
estimates  with respect not only to the overall level of poverty, but also yield markedly
different  regional  poverty  profiles.  In particular,  the "altemative"  poverty  lines  indicate  larger
disparities  in poverty  between  urban and rural areas  than the official  method.
The two sets of poverty lines described  above are intended  to capture the differential  in the
cost of reaching a given standard of living across Indonesia's provinces (and urban/rural
sectors).  It  is possible to use these poverty lines to construct respectively,  two sets of
regional price  indices. If  we  then deflate nominal per  capita consumption in  each
province/sector  using a  given price index, we obtain a  measure of "real" per  capita
consumption. It is straightforward  to show that if we measure poverty in terms of real
consumption  and a single, national poverty line (the population weighted average of the
province/sector-specific  poverty lines) we obtain the same poverty rates as were reported
above based on nominal consumption  and a regional set of poverty lines.v  As mentioned
above,  the attraction  of constructing  a measure  of real consumption  is that we then obtain the
comparability  across households  needed to undertake  the benefit incidence  analysis.
Figure  2 shows the distribution  function  of per capita  consumption  and various poverty  lines.
Three distribution  functions  are given. The first is in nominal terms, the second is in real
terns using the official  poverty  lines as price deflators  and the third is in real terms using the
"alternative"  poverty lines as price deflators. Both the "official" and "alternative"  national
poverty  lines are considerably  below the international  standard  of 2 US dollars  a day (in 1985
prices), a poverty  line that is often used for international  poverty  comparisons.  According  to
the World  Development  Indicators (World Bank, 1999) 50.4 percent of the population of
Indonesia  lived  below the $2 a day poverty  line.
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Figure  2 Distribution  function  of per capita consumption  and poverty  lines in 1996
Choosing a price index
6Which of the two "real" consumption  vectors  (one based on the official  poverty  lines and the
other based on the "alternative"  poverty  lines) should  be used in the subsequent  analysis? It
is not immediately  obvious which set of poverty lines is preferable  to use as regional  price
deflators. To resolve  the issue for this study,  we start by recognizing  that poverty is a multi-
dimensional  phenomenon.  Other factors in life, such as education  or a clean environment,
also directly influence individual welfare. To decide between our two price deflators, we
choose the one which yields a regional poverty  profile that best mirrors regional patterns of
well-being  resulting from a set of other, non-monetary,  indicators of welfare. The indicators
we use are (I) self-reported  illiteracy of the population aged 15 and above, (2) fraction of
children aged 15 to 17 that did not complete  primary school, (3) child mortality"'  and (4) the
percent of children under 5 that are malnourished."'  We rescaled the "alternative"  poverty
lines by a constant such that they yield the same poverty head count as the official  poverty
lines on a national level.  The results by region  -are  shown in Table 1. The Spearman's  rank
correlations  are shown in Table 2.  We find that the profile based on the "alternative"  set of
poverty lines shows a  consistently higher degree of correlation with the non-monetary
indicators  of welfare than the official  poverty  lines.  We therefore opt for the "alternative"  set
of poverty lines as regional price deflators  in the remainder  of this study. The resulting  real
per capita  consumption  is the basis on which we will calculate  consumption  quintiles.
7Table I Headcount  Rates  and other  indicators  of welfare  by region  in 1996
Province  Area  Perc.  Poor  Perc. Poor  Adult  children  Infant  Children
using  using  illiteracy  aged 15-17 mortality  mal-
official  alternative (%)  that  did not  nourished
poverty  rescaled  complete  (%/0)
lines  poverty  primary
lines  school  (%)
Aceh  Urban  7.2  5.4  3.38  4.1  43  46
Rural  11.1  8.2  11.74  ,9.0  49  48
North Sumatra  Urban  9.5  3.8  2.19  4.1  57  43
Rural  11.7  8.2  7.93  10.9  53  38
West  Sumatra  Urban  5.3  2.1  3.07  5.2  43  29
Rural  9.9  4.6  10.11  12.3  79  30
Riau  Urban  4.4  4.4  4.29  3.5  0  27
Rural  9.5  12.8  7.92  12.6  49  38
Jambi  Urban  7.5  2.2  3.71  3.2  37  28
Rural  9.2  4.7  10.05  13.4  58  35
South  Sumatra  Urban  12.2  0.9  4.68  5.1  41  25
Rural  10.6  12.7  11.96  21.4  63  31
Bengkulu  Urban  6.1  6.1  2.31  5.0  46  20
Rural  10.4  19.3  10.80  17.9  72  26
Lampung  Urban  9.2  7.5  5.03  5.7  54  20
Rural  11.1  24.2  11.33  9.8  63  35
Jakarta  Urban  2.5  1.4  3.19  2.9  34  22
West  Java  Urban  10.1  4.6  6.05  5.1  47  24
Rural  9.3  8.2  13.79  12.1  75  28
Central  Java  Urban  13.9  3.0  12.11  4.8  44  27
Rural  14.1  14.0  22.04  7.4  49  29
Yogyakarta  Urban  12.1  5.7  13.53  2.9  0  25
Rural  7.4  8.5  27.06  6.1  38  33
East Java  Urban  13.3  11.0  10.24  3.8  42  27
Rural  11.1  17.8  28.28  11.2  65  30
Bali  Urban  5.4  4.4  11.59  3.7  39  20
Rural  3.7  4.0  25.56  11.2  47  21
West  Nusa  Tengara  Urban  19.7  15.4  18.57  14.1  80  37
Rural  17.1  16.5  35.41  19.7  113  39
East  Nusa  Tengara  Urban  14.3  15.7  5.48  5.8  37  43
Rural  19.6  34.4  23.85  26.3  67  37
East  Timor  Urban  15.1  5.7  17.15  11.0  48  24
Rural  33.1  32.8  57.87  44.8  84  38
West  Kalimantan  Urban  11.7  4.6  11.74  7.3  51  24
Rural  23.6  29.3  22.02  23.5  69  44
Central  Kalimantan  Urban  6.8  2.8  2.80  6.1  39  33
Rural  13.0  8.9  7.51  14.1  48  33
South Kalimantan  Urban  10.7  1.0  5.09  7.4  55  28
Rural  13.7  4.7  11.84  17.3  93  34
Continued  on next page
8Table 1- continued from previous page
Province  area  Perc. Poor  Perc. Poor  Adult  children  infant  children
using  using  illiteracy  aged 15-17 mortality  mal-
official  alternative (%)  that did not  nourished
poverty  rescaled  complete  (%)
lines  poverty  primary
lines  school (%)
East Kalimantan  Urban  5.3  0.6  5.66  6.0  43  22
Rural  12.2  15.6  14.04  11.2  70  31
North Sulawesi  Urban  6.5  4.9  1.76  9.3  42  30
Rural  12.5  31.2  3.77  17.8  42  36
Central  Sulawesi  Urban  5.1  3.0  4.67  6.9  58  27
Rural  9.3  13.2  11.06  13.3  84  39
South Sulawesi  Urban  11.5  7.0  9.17  8.9  48  30
Rural  6.6  14.5  25.26  19.6  66  32
South East Sulawesi  Urban  7.1  12.0  7.05  7.8  46  26
Rural  8.4  21.3  15.87  16.5  65  28
Maluku  Urban  6.4  4.2  1.24  2.8  34  29
Rural  24.7  26.9  8.93  11.1  56  22
Irian  Jaya  Urban  9.5  6.0  3.59  4.7  53  29
Rural  23.7  53.9  44.13  35.4  53  28
Indonesia  Urban  9.8  5.0  7.12  4.8  39  27
Rural  12.0  14.8  19.23  13.1  65  32
11.1  11.1  14.66  9.8  57  30
|Nr. of observations  264,786  264,786  588,689  60,219  82,150
Source:  Poverty  estimates,  literacy,  primary  school completion  and infant mortality  based  on author's
calculations  using 1996  Susenas.  Malnutrition  data are copied  from based  on results from Saadah,  Waters,  and
Heywood  (1999)  who use the 1998  Susenas.
9Table 2 Spearman's rank correlation  between poverty indices and other welfare
measures
Adult  illiteracy  Children aged infant mortality  children  mal-
(%)  15-17 that  did  nourished
not  complete  (%/
primary school
(%)
Perc.  Poor  using  0.514  0.460  0.398  0.315
official  poverty  lines
Perc.  Poor  using 0.569  0.683  0.491  0.405
alternative  poverty
lines
Note: Calculations  based on regional  poverty  indices  presented  in table 1.
Regional Poverty
Table 3 reproduces  the regional poverty  profile reported in Table 1, based on our preferred
consumption  measure,  and on the basis of the headcount  measure  plus two additional  poverty
measures: the poverty gap (or FGTl);  and the squared poverty gap (FGT2).v.' These two
poverty measures differ from the headcount (or FGTO)  in that they take into account the
distance of poor individuals  from the poverty line. Thus they take into account the varying
"depth"  of poverty  of different individuals.  The FGT2  measure  is more sensitive  to those who
are very far from the poverty line than the FGT1 measure. It is clear that comparisons  of
poverty,  across, say, regions, need not be the same across different measures. Indeed, as
Table 3 indicates,  while all three poverty measures clearly identify rural Irian Jaya as the
poorest region in the country, the two distributionally  sensitive poverty measures find the
next poorest region to be rural East Timor, while  the headcount  measure finds it to be rural
East Nusa Tengara. In general, and as mentioned  above, the regional poverty profile based
on our preferred regional price deflators (the alternative  set of poverty lines) tends to find
much higher rural than urban poverty. If anything this is even more strongly the case with
non-monetary  indicators  of wellbeing  (see Table 1).
10Table 3 FGT Measures  of Poverty, 1996.
Province  Area  Headcount  Poverty  gap  FGT  2
Aceh  Urban  0.05  0.0081  0.0019
Rural  0.08  0.0109  0.0023
North Sumatra  Urban  0.04  0.0050  0.0011
Rural  0.08  0.0119  0.0029
West Sumatra  Urban  0.02  0.0023  0.0004
Rural  0.05  0.0059  0.0013
Riau  Urban  0.04  0.0063  0.0016
________________  Rural  0.13  0.0199  0.0051
Jambi  Urban  0.02  0.0026  0.0005
Rural  0.05  0.0092  0.0027
South Sumatra  Urban  0.01  0.0008  0.0001
Rural  0.13  0.0166  0.0036
Bengkulu  Urban  0.06  0.0093  0.0021
Rural  0.19  0.0382  0.0113
Lampung  Urban  0.08  0.0113  0.0024
Rural  0.24  0.0413  0.0108
Jakarta  Urban  0.01  0.0019  0.0004
West Java  Urban  0.05  0.0072  0.0017
Rural  0.08  0.0104  0.0020
Central  Java  Urban  0.03  0.0045  0.0012
Rural  0.14  0.0222  0.0054
Yogyakarta  Urban  0.06  0.0068  0.0014
Rural  0.09  0.0133  0.0033
East Java  Urban  0.11  0.0153  0.0034
________________  Rural  0.18  0.0279  0.0068
Bali  Urban  0.04  0.0048  0.0009
Rural  0.04  0.0059  0.0012
West  Nusa Tengara  Urban  0.15  0.0211  0.0047
Rural  0.17  0.0245  0.0055
East Nusa  Tengara  Urban  0.16  0.0268  0.0069
Rural  0.34  0.0660  0.0193
East Timor  Urban  0.06  0.0088  0.0018
Rural  0.33  0.0700  0.0210
West  Kalimantan  Urban  0.05  0.0059  0.0013
Rural  0.29  0.0476  0.0110
Central  Kalimantan  Urban  0.03  0.0053  0.0015
Rural  0.09  0.0111  0.0021
South Kalimantan  Urban  0.01  0.0014  0.0003
Rural  0.05  0.0050  0.0009
East Kalimantan  Urban  0.01  0.0008  0.0001
Rural  0.16  0.0269  0.0074
Continued on next page
11Table 3 - continued from  previous page
Province  Area  Headcount  Poverty  gap  FGT 2
North Sulawesi  Urban  0.05  0.0078  0.0017
Rural  0.31  0.0677  0.0216
Central  Sulawesi  Urban  0.03  0.0042  0.0009
Rural  0.13  0.0205  0.0048
South Sulawesi  Urban  0.07  0.0098  0.0022
Rural  0.14  0.0241  0.0059
South  East Sulawesi  Urban  0.12  0.0342  0.0149
Rural  0.21  0.0352  0.0088
Maluku  Urban  0.04  0.0058  0.0010
Rural  0.27  0.0502  0.0143
Irian Jaya  Urban  0.06  0.0081  0.0014
Rural  0.54  0.1520  0.0580
Indonesia  Urban  0.05  0.0072  0.0017
Rural  0.15  0.0243  0.0063
0.11  0.0179  0.0046
Nr. of observations  264,786  264,786  264,786
Source:  Author's calculations  based on 1996  Susenas  household  survey
2.2 Education
National Trends
Indonesia  has achieved remarkable  increases  in enrollment over the past decades.,  Figure 3
shows  the gross enrollment  rate by school type from 1971  to 1997.  Universal  primary school
enrollment  was reached around 1986.  Since  the extension  of the mandatory  school going age
up to 15 years, enrolment in junior secondary  has been increasing steadily but is not yet
universal. In  1997, gross enrollment in junior secondary was 72.2 percent while gross
enrollment  in senior secondary  stood  at 46.5 percent  (BPS 1997).
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Figure 3 Gross  enrolment  rates from 1971  to 1997  by school level
The effects  the financial  crisis on enrollment  at the national  level seem to have been limited.
Table 4 presents enrollment  rates from 1995  to 1999.  From 1997  to 1998,  a small decrease in
enrollment was recorded (Pradhan and Sparrow, 2000). In the next year, all  losses in
enrollment were recovered. At the senior secondary  level, enrollment  has continued to rise
steadily  over the course of the crisis. There is, however,  evidence of delayed enrollment  as a
result of the crisis. The average age of children  by school  type was decreasing  up to 1997  and
since then has risen continuously. The average age of children in primary school dropped
from 9.75  to 9.59 from 1995  to 1997  and since then steadily  increased to 9.60 in 1998  and to
9.61 in  1999.  A similar trend can be observed for the transition from junior to senior
secondary  school. The average age of junior secondary  students moved from 14.23 in 1995,
to 14.18  in 1997,  to 14.21 in 1998  to 14.27  in 1999.  Evidence  from a school survey (Filmer
and others, 1999) confirms  the delayed enrolment  in basic education.  The school survey also
indicates that in some regions the effects of the crisis on enrollment have been severe.
Enrolment  for boys in primary school in the poor areas of Jakarta fell by 8 percent. At the
junior secondary  level, Jakarta, urban Central Java, and urban Maluku saw large enrollment
declines (8.6%, 5.7%, and 5.8%, respectively); while rural South Sulawesi saw an 8.1%
increase (a fact which may be associated  with the cash crop nature of its economy). This is
not always  confirmed  when we look at the Susenas  data. For instance,  the gross enrollment  at
the  junior secondary  level in urban Central Java dropped  only from 87.9 to 87.4 from 1997  to
1998 according  to the Susenas.  One possible explanation  for the discrepancy  is that schools
record absenteeism as dropouts while households record an  absent child as still being
enrolled. According to the Susenas, the percentage of  children enrolled in  school who
indicate  that their main activity  is going to school decreased  by 2.8 percent  point for children
in primary  school,  by 2.4 percent point for those in junior secondary  and by 2.3 percent point
for those in senior secondary  from 1197 to 1998. The drops were larger in the rural areas -
around 3 percent for all school types. In 1999,  enrolled children  reported  to go to school more
frequently,  although  the pre-crisis  level has not been retained.
13Table 4 Gross en net enrollment  in primary,  junior secondary  and senior
secondary  level in 1995,1997,  1998  and 1999
1995  1997  1998  1999
Gross  enrollment
Primary  107.0  108.0  107.6  108.0
junior secondary  65.7  74.2  73.4  76.1
senior secondary  42.4  46.6  47.4  48.4
Net enrollment
Primary  91.5  92.3  92.1  92.6
junior secondary  51.0  57.8  57.1  59.2
senior  secondary  32.6  36.6  37.5  38.5
Source:  Author's calculations  based  on Susenas  household  surveys
Regional Patterns
As mentioned  above,  Indonesia  is a diverse country  and many of the larger islands could  be
considered  a country  by themselves  if one considers  their size and population.  For this reason
it is important to explore geographic variation in education indicators. Table 1 presents
outcome indicators for poverty, education and health, in turn. The first 8 provinces  in this
Table represent  Sumatra,  moving  from north to south. Adult literacy  rates are notably  low in
North Sumatra. The southern provinces on this island face real problems with school
enrollment  in the rural areas.  Around  20 percent of the children  aged 15-17  in Bengkulu  and
South Sumatra  are not enrolled  in school.
Java is the most populous  island  in Indonesia,  with about half of Indonesia's  total population.
Although  Central Java is the poorest  province on the island in terms of the head count ratio,
this does not show up in the other social indicators.  Adult illiteracy  is a large problem in the
eastern provinces in the rural areas. About a quarter of the adult population reports to be
illiterate,  higher  than in any province  in Sumatra  (and compared  to a national  illiteracy  rate of
15 percent). School enrollment is relatively high throughout  Java. Only in rural West Java
and East Java the percent of children  aged 15-17  not enrolled  in school  exceeds 10  percent.
Bali, although  technically  belonging  to the eastern  provinces,  resembles  Java fairly closely.
Poverty is low, and the other indicators  are comparable  in magnitude  to those found in Java.
The other eastern provinces, however, comprising  West Nusa Tengara, East Nusa Tengara
and East Timor, scoring  badly on all indicators.  Poverty  is over 15 percent in both urban and
rural areas according to the official poverty lines. In rural East-Timor  it stands at over 30
percent. Illiteracy is high in rural West Nusa Tengara and E-Timor.  Children drop out of
school  at an early age, especially  in the rural areas  of East Timor  and East Nusa Tengara.
Kalimantan  shows very high disparities among urban and rural areas, especially in West
Kalimantan. Poverty in  rural W-Kalimantan is  more than twice that  of  urban West-
Kalimantan,  even using the official poverty measures.  Illiteracy rates, and also enrollment
rates, are substantially  higher in rural areas.
14In North and Central Sulawesi,  the patterns  are broadly similar to those observed elsewhere.
South Sulawesi shows high (25%) adult illiteracy in rural areas. Remarkably,  the official
poverty indicators rank urban South Sulawesi above rural South Sulawesi. This is not
confirmed  in any of the other social indicators. Maluku records  high rural poverty  rates - 25
percent using the official poverty line - but otherwise  scores above the national  average on
educational  outcomes.  Rural Irian  Jaya scores  particularly  badly on the poverty  and education
indicators.
An important  observation  with respect to regional patterns of poverty and education  is that
while considerable heterogeneity is observed this variation does not occur only between
islands, or between say, Java and the rest of the country,  but is also observed  within  the major
islands.  For example, while much of Java does relatively well (compared to  national
averages)  in terms of the incidence of poverty,  East Java does quite badly. Similarly,  while
West Kalimantan does quite badly in terms of poverty and education outcomes (and also
health outcomes, see below), the situation is  far less worrisome in Central Kalimantan.
Heterogeneity, observed within  regions, probably indicates that  the  more  simplistic
explanations  for the distribution of welfare outcomes,  in terms of government  capture by a




Health indicators  have been improving  steadily  during recent decades. Figure 4 shows trends
in child mortality and life expectancy.  Infant mortality dropped from 118 in 1970 to 49 at
present.  Life expectancy  at birth rose from 48 to 65 years over the same  period.  Despite  these
impressive  achievements,  Indonesia's indicators still lag behind those of its neighbors. For
example, life expectancy at birth in Malaysia stands at 72, 66 in the Philippines and 70
Thailand.  The figures on child mortality  tell a similar story.  Infant mortality  in 1996  was 11.4
in Malaysia,  37 in the Philippines  and 34 in Thailand.
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Figure 4 Trends  in health outcomes  (Source:  World  Development  Indicators,  World
Bank 1998)
Survey  data indicate  that the recent economic  crisis has had negative  effects on self-reported
morbidity(Pradhan  and  Sparrow 2000). The SUSENAS household surveys document a
reversal in the positive  trend observed from 1995  to 1997 (Figure  5). Self-reported  morbidity
(percent of population which self-reported  illness in the past month) dropped from 25.4
percent in 1995 to 24.4 percent in 1997 but then rose again to 25.5 percent in 1998. From
1998 to  1999, morbidity fell  back to 24.6 percent.  Figure 5 shows the patterns in age
specific morbidity. The national pattern as described above is found for all adults. For
children, reported morbidity has increased continuously  from 1995 to 1999. This does not
necessarily imply that children's health status has worsened over time. Another possible
explanation is that parent's have become more aware of children's illnesses and therefore
report them as sick more frequently.  Nutritional  indicators of children under age 5 do not
show any worsening over the course of  the crisis (Saadah, Pradhan, Surbakti, 1999).
Malnutrition,  as measured  by weight  for age, is a sensitive  measure  for short-term  changes  in
nutritional status.  From 1998 to  1999, malnutrition dropped from 29.8 percent to 28.5
percent.  Malnutrition  continued  to improve  in spite of the economic  crisis. In the urban areas,
where the crisis hit the hardest, the drop in the malnutrition rate was higher (1.7 percent
point) than in the rural areas (1.4 percent point). Boys saw greater improvements  in their
nutritional  status (2.5 percent point drop) than girls (0.2 percent point drop), although  in 1999
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Figure 5 Changes  in morbidity  by age category  (percent)
A clear effect of the crisis is found in utilization  patterns. Figure 6 shows the evolution  of
utilization rates by provider over time. Utilization rates (percent of population visiting
provider  during last month) for modern medical  facilities dropped from 12.8 in 1997  to 10.5
in 1998, with most of the fall due to a drop in the use of public services  (Saadah,  Pradhan,
Surbakti, 1999). The  drop  in  utilization rates is  also  recorded in  the  IFLS surveys
(Frankenberg  et al 1999).. The shift away from the public sector may in part be due to a
deterioration  of quality of public sector services  resulting from a drop in real government
health care expenditures. Real per capita government health care expenditures fell by 9
percent in fiscal year 1997/1998  and by 13 percent in fiscal 1998/1999  (Saadah,  Lieberman,
Juwono, 1999). 1999 saw a partial recovery  of utilization  rates in the public sector. A likely
explanation  for the recovery is the start of the social safety net program. This large-scale
program included a health card, distributed to the poor, which entitled the owner to free
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Figure 6: Proportion of ill people that consulted a health care provider, on an
outpatient  basis, in 1995  and 1998,  by type of provider  (percent)
Regional Patterns
On the whole, health outcomes  across Indonesia's  provinces  track education  outcomes fairly
closely. Once again, the  impression  is of considerable  geographic  variation. While Indonesia
as a whole has fairly encouraging education  and health indicators, this hides the fact that
there exist  pockets  of considerable  hardship.
In  Sumatra, the provinces face  high  infant mortality, but  surprisingly, not  so  much
malnutrition  (measured  in termns  of weight for height for children under 5). Malnutrition  is a
significant  problem in Aceh, the most northemn  province.  Almost 50 percent of the children
in this province are malnourished.  In rural West Java infant mortality  is also quite high - 75
per 1000  live births. The malnutrition  indicators  are very similar across  Java, with children in
rural areas  facing a slightly  higher  probability  of being  malnourished.
Within the Eastemn  provinces,  rural West Nusa  Tengara  is the only region  in all of Indonesia
with an infant  mortality  rate over 100. In these provinces,  around  38 percent  of the children
in rural areas  are malnourished. In Kalimantan,  ,malnourishment  is also quite high.
Particularly  striking  is the high  - 93 per 1000  births  - infant mortality  rate recorded  in rutral
South  Kalimantan. A similarly  high infant  mortality  rate (84 per 1  000)  is observed  in rural
Central  Sulawesi.  In this region,  other health indicators  are similar to the national  averages.
3. Links  Between  Poverty,  Education  and Health
Why do govemnments  care about education  and health outcomes? Improvement  of education
and health outcomes is sought because of their intrinsic value in raising capabilities and
individual  freedoms.  They  also have an instrumental  value in contributing  to higher  incomes,
and in reinforcing  each other.x
1  8The main asset of the poor is their labor. Education  and health are critical to preserving  and
enhancing  the quality of this asset, and for this reason investment  in health and education  is
especially  important  for the poor.  The 1990 World Development  Report (1990),  as well as
the forthcoming  World Development  2000/1, conclude that investments in basic health and
education  are an important  element of a poverty  reduction  strategy.  In this section  we review
the empirical  evidence for this claim for Indonesia. Increasingly  it is recognized  that health
and education  investments  are choice variables and cannot be treated as exogenous.  Recent
articles  dealt with this problem explicitly  when estimating  returns to education  and health for
Indonesia.
A common  theme in the literature is that health and education  not only benefit those who
receive it. They also carry  external  effects in the sense  that person living  near to the ones who
received the investment may benefit.  Improved education of mothers may carry second-
generation  effects through  healthier  or better-educated  children.  Improved  health will decease
the risk for infectious  diseases for those who live in the neighborhood.  Again, we review  the
empirical  evidence  for Indonesia.
Economic returns to education and health
The classical  way of getting to returns to education  is by estimating a Mincerian earnings
function.  Private  rate of returns estimated  in this way are typically in the order of 12 percent
(Psacharopoulos,  1994) and are the highest for primary education and females. Using 1981
data for urban Java, Byron and Takahashi  (1989)  find a 17  percent rate of return,  much  higher
than found is most other countries. Social rate of return calculations take into account, in
addition, the foregone  eamings and the resources costs associated with providing  education.
McMahon  and Boediono (1992) find high social rates of returns to investments in junior
secondary  education.  Using wage data from 1982 to 1989,  the social rate of return for junior
secondary  school is estimated  at 14 percent and for senior secondary  at 11 percent. They also
estimate  that agricultural  out put can increase  by 10 percent if farmers  completed  9 instead  of
5 years of education.
Bedi and Garg (2000)  examine  the effectiveness  of public versus private secondary  schools  in
Indonesia  using  the 1993  Family Life Survey.  They find, after correcting  for selectivity  using
a selection  model and contrary to the conventional  wisdom, that private schools are more
efficient.  The reason for the discrepancy  is that their results indicate  a clear negative  selection
effect into private schools,  meaning that the students in private schools start at a lower level
than those who start in public schools.  Even though the average earnings  of a public school
graduate is higher than that of a private school graduate, the value added of the private
schools turns out to be higher. Public school graduates  earn on average 31 percent more than
those who a attended  private Islamic or private non-religious  school, and earn 14 percent less
than those who attended a private Christian school. Correcting for the selection  effect, the
advantage  of the public schools  versus  the Islamic schools  is wiped out and replaced  into a 75
percent disadvantage.  The advantage of public schools over private non-religious schools
increases  to 47 while the public versus Christian  private school earnings disadvantage  drops
to 5 percent. The results are based on a multinomial  logit school selection  model which is
estimated  simultaneously  with earning equations.  Time constant  and reflective information  is
used to model the school selection decision the respondents  faced in their youth. Regional
19dummies, which indicate the province the respondent grew up,  are  used to  achieve
identification. Regional dummies reflecting the current residence enter into the earning
equations.  The model is thus identified  by virtue of migration  -21 percent of the individuals
moved between provinces  after completing  their education  - which is treated as exogenous.
A drawback  of the model, which applies  to all selection  models,  is that it is very difficult  to
estimate the constant term in the earnings equations in these models (Heckman 1990,
Andrews and Schafgans 1998).  Non parametric  identification  of the constant  term requires  a
non-zero  fraction of the population  having  a probability  close to one of being selected  into a
particular school type. In a standard selection  model, the contant term is indentified as a
result of the chosen functional form of the model. The estimates of the constant terms
influence the conclusions to a great extent and are likely to be  sensitive to the chosen
functional  form (Pradhan  and van Soest 1995).
Duflo (forthcoming)  estimates  the rates of return to primary education  recognizing  that the
investment decision may be  endogenous and carefully corrects for  it using a  natural
experiment. She corrects for the endogeneity of  schooling by  exploiting regional and
intertemporal  variations in the Indonesian investment program for primary schools (SD
INPRES),  which was launched in 1973. The program  was targeted  to reach first those areas
with the worst educational  outcomes.  As a result,  the baseline data (before the intervention),
indicate lower investments in  education in  the intervention areas. Using birth cohort
information combined with detailed regional information on the amount and timing of
investments,  the author can trace which respondents  in the later surveys  were exposed to the
program. Using a difference in difference  type of approach, she estimates  a private rate of
return of primary education for those exposed to the program in the order of 8.6 to  10.6
percent.  This estimate is lower than most of the previous estimates but in line with the
decline in  estimated rates of  return over time.  World Bank (1990) reports estimates
decreasing  from 19 percent in 1982 to 10 percent in 1986.  Duflo also shows that investments
in primary school infrastructure  have led to an increase years of education.  For each new
school built per  1000 children, the average years of education of children aged 2 to  6
increased  by 0.12 to 0.19. These  investments  translated  into an increase  in wages  of 1.5 to 2.7
percent for each additional school built per 1000  children. The results indicate  that the rapid
expansion  of the Indonesian  school system in the seventies  did not result in a deterioration  of
the quality  of education.
The effects of improved health on earnings are even harder to obtain. The only objective
health status variables  which are collected  on a regular basis are nutritional  indicators,  which
are only collected for young children and thus do not provide a basis for economic  rate of
return calculations. Self reported health care status  is biased because norms of what
constitutes an illness vary for different groups of the population. A common finding in
Indonesia for instance is that wealthier households  report ill more often, a finding that is
probably not caused by differences in the underlying  health status between poor and rich.
These  problems  are not unique to Indonesia.  Strauss  and Thomas  (1998)  review the empirical
evidence.  Using height as a proxy for health, they do find positive returns to health on the
labor market, even after correcting for  education. This sort of  analysis has the  same
shortcomings  as the standard Mincerian earnings  equation to estimate returns to education.
Length could  very well be a proxy for good upbringing,  which does not only affect health but
also unobservables  such as entrepreneurial  spirit. If the two are correlated, the estimates
20suffer from a omitted  variable  bias and wrongfully  allocate the effect of entrepreneurial  spirit
to good  health.
Dow et al (1997) use experimental  data to  get at the effect of health on labor market
outcomes in Indonesia. The study is based on data generated  by the Indonesian  Resource
Mobilization  Study  in the early 1990s.  This study involved  an increase  in the price in a set of
randomly  chosen health clinics in two provinces  of the country.  The main objective of the
study was to get an estimate of the price elasticity of health care demand (which will be
discussed  later). A simple difference  in difference  approach  indicates  that, when using self-
reported health status, those living in the areas where prices were increased experienced  an
improvement in health status. At the same time, as we will discuss later, the demand for
health decreased  in these areas. While few will argue  that doctors make patients more sick, a
more likely explanation  is that self-reported  health is influenced  by utilization.  Those who
visit a doctor are more likely to report themselves  ill, irrespective  of their healthy status.
More objective  measures show weak evidence  for deteriorated  health in the treatment areas
(only significant  for males, not for females).  The  percentage  reporting  that they cannot walk 5
kilometers,  the number of days that activity  were limited all show significant  positive effects
as a result of the price increase for males. Having  presented  the evidence  of the price increase
on health, the authors continue to investigate  the indirect  effect on labor market participation
and earnings. For males no significant effect on labor market participation  are found. For
females, however, a significant  negative effect on labor market participation  is found as a
result of the price increase. As a  result of the price increase the female labor market
participation  dropped  by 7.3 percent point. Wage regressions  show a negative  of effect of the
price increases  of 15 percent for males (in the wage sector).  For females no significant  effect
on wages are found. Summarizing,  the findings of this study indicate  that there are effects of
health on labor market outcomes,  in the direction  as hypothesized,  but not always significant
in every  case.
Indirect effects
One can think of many indirect  effects of education  and health and it is beyond the scope of
this paper to review all of them. Instead,  we will focus on two papers which allow us to say
something about the effects of parent's education on the nutritional status and education
investments  of their children. Using the 1998 Susenas household survey, Skoufias (1999)
finds positive significant  effects of mother's education  on the nutritional status of children
aged zero to five. His regression  estimates,  which correct for unobserved  regional variations,
consumption,  sanitation facilities of the household, father's education and the household
composition,  indicate  that if the mother's education  is beyond primary,  the nutritional status
of boys measured  in terms of weight for age improves  (see Table 5). For girls a significant
effect of education  is only found if the education  of the mother is more than senior secondary
in urban areas or the education of the household  head is junior secondary  in rural areas. No
effect is found for the father's education.  Pradhan (1998) investigates  the effects of parent's
education  on boys and girls enrollment  in secondary  school. Correcting for similar variables
as Skoufias,  he finds that one additional  year of education  of the mother increases enrolment
by 0.9 percent point for girls and 1.5 percent point for boys. Stronger and larger effects are
found for the father's education.  The mother's education  has more effect on reducing delayed
enrollment  than the father's education.
21Table 5 Returns  to parental  education  on malnutrition  of children aged  2-6 as measured  by
weight for age Z score
Rural  Urban
Boys  girls  boys  girls
coeff  t value  coeff  t value  Coeff  t value  coeff  t value
Mother's  education  level (primary
excluded ca aogy)
junior high  0.260  2.76  -0.072  -0.67  0.096  0.58  -0.061  -0.43
senior high  0.216  1.60  -0.133  -0.72  0.683  3.91  0.064  0.4
more  than  -0.131  -0.38  0.451  0.98  0.869  2.28  1.026  3.61
senior high
Household  head's  education  level
junior high  0.059  0.79  0.198  2.08  0.11  0.59  0.003  0.02
senior  high  0.117  1.06  0.139  1.16  0.034  0.2  -0.138  -0.91
more  than  0.079  0.34  -0.036-  -0.11  -0.087  -0.33  -0.297  -1.31
senior high  .
Source:  copied  from Skoufias  (1999). Regression  also included  age, family composition,  consumption,  housing
and asset variables  as well as a set of regional  dummies.
We are not aware  of any studies  that make a serious  attempt  to estimate  the indirect  effect of
investments  in health in Indonesia
3.  Demand  for Education  and Health
The evidence  presented  in the preceding  sections  explain,  at least in part, the interest  of the
Indonesian  government  in welcoming  consumption  of social services. However,  those
arguments  do not, in and of themselves,  provide  justification  for government  intervention.
Typically,  the case for government  intervention  is based on the argument  that education  and
health generate  positive  externalities for society  as a whole, as well as the equity concern  that
without  public price subsidies  only the wealthy  would  be able to afford health care.
This latter question  can be investigated  by studying  the demand  for education  and health. In
particular,  the issue arises as to what might  be the impact  of the government  reducing
subsidies  in the social sectors;  a question  of great  current import given  the particularly
stretched  public finances  of the Indonesian  government  following  the economic  crisis. A key
empirical  question  relates to the sensitivity  of education  and health utilization  to prices. If
individuals  are very sensitive  to prices,  then reducing  subsidies  would  offer little relief to the
budget  and the education  and health systems  run the risk of no longer  reaching  the whole
population. Moreover,  if the poor are more  price sensitive  than the nonpoor,  then reducing
subsidies  will lead to greater inequality  in access  to education  and health services. An
understanding  of such  behavioral  responses  is a key input into any discussion  of social sector
spending  reform.
While  these issues  are of unquestioned  importance,  investigating  them empirically  poses
considerable  challenges,  from both a technical  perspective  as well as in terms of data
22requirements. We have not been able to study  these issues directly  with the data available  to
us, but present  below a brief summary  of the main findings  from recent  research  into these
questions.
Education
Alisjahbana  (1994) analyzes the demand  for schooling  recognizing  that quality varies across
schools. Her study is based on the 1989 Susenas household survey. Quality of schools is
estimated using  an  indirect method which  attributes regional variation in  schooling
expenditures  which cannot  be explained  by household  characteristics  to differences  in school
quality. Using distance as a proxy for prices, she finds significant  negative effect of the
distance to the nearest school for all age groups. The results indicate that building more
schools, and thereby reducing the distance, will yield an increase in enrollment, a result
which was also found in Duflo (forthcoming).  Her quality adjusted  estimated  price elasticities
are reproduced  in Table 6. Significant  negative  own price elasticities  and positive cross  price
effects are found for junior secondary  schools with the exception  of the own price effect for.
public schools. At the primary level no significant  effects are found. The same holds for the
own price elasticities  at the junior secondary  level. At this level the opportunity  costs of time
- proxied by the local wage rate - is a more important determinant  for enrollment  than the
costs of education. The author finds some evidence of gender differences.  The estimates  on
the education  of the mother, the female local wage rate and the constant term in the school
participation  model  vary significantly  by gender. This implies that, cetirus paribus, male
children have a higher probability of enrollment in  a private college relative to  female
children in the same age group. Better educated mothers tend to provide more schooling
opportunities  for boys at private schools. If the imputed female adult wage rates reflect the
earning opportunities for  the  mother, better opportunities result  in  higher enrollment
probabilities  of the female children  at private schools.
Table 6 Own and cross quality adjusted  price elasticities  of private and public schooling  by
schooling  level (* indicates  significance  at the 5 percent level)
primary  school  junior  secondary  senior  secondary
with respect  to the price of: public  private  public  Private  public  private
Public  -0.078  0.711  -0.453  0.771^  0.211  0.236
Private  0.213  -0.546  0.126  -0.296  -0.580  -0.122
Source:  Alisjahbana  (1994)
Health
There are very few published studies on the demand for health in Indonesia. An important,
but as yet unpublished,  study was carried out in a joint research project partially funded by
the World Bank Research  Department. The Indonesian  Resource  Mobilization  Study (IRMS)
is an explicit social experiment in two provinces of Indonesia (East Kalimantan and West
Nusa Tengara) designed to  measure behavioural responses to  alternative health pricing
policies.  The brief summary of preliminary  results presented here is taken from an interim
progress  report  presented to the World  Bank Research  department  (Gertler, 1995).
23The IRMS project applies an  experimental case-control longitudinal study design that
observed individuals  and providors  before and after experimentally  designed fee changes  in
treatment and control areas of the two Indonesian provinces of KalTim and West Nusa
Tengara. A baseline survey of 6000 households  from both treatment and control districts,
plus a  concurrent survey of  the  over  1000 medical care providers that  served these
households,  was fielded in 1991, before  the implementation  of fee increases  in the treatment
areas. A follow  up survey  of the same  households  and providers  was conducted  in 1993  after
the fee increases in treatment areas and quality changes in both areas, but before most fee
increases in  the control areas.  This  approach was porposively designed to  help the
investigators  overcome  the serious endogeneity  problems  which limit traditional approaches
to estimating  demand  elasticities.
Preliminary  findings from this study indicate that demand for hospital care in these two
provinces  is very elastic for upper range of the observed  price distribution.  Raising  user fees
beyond  Rp 5,000  could  lead to absolute  reductions  in revenues  for hospitals. The demand  for
health center and health  subcenter care are much more price  inelastic implying that
substantial  revenues  would  be raised if fees were raised to Rp 1000 at health subcenters  and
Rp 1500 at health centers. As price elasticities  are negative  and significant,  increasing  user
fees at health centers, subcenters and hospitals would also reduce utilization.  Moreover,
utilization  would drop twice as fast among individuals  in the poorest quintile. Looking  at the
effect on total health utilization  (which captures  also the switch from public to private sector
providers) yielded the finding that as a result of a fee increase the number of poor using
public facilities not only falls proportionately  more than other groups, but proportionately
more of the poor do not obtain any formal  medical care. These  broad findings were supported
also by analysis  at the health provider level. Finally, the study provides some evidence  that
raising prices of health services leads to observed deterioration  of directly observed  health
status.
5.  Institutional Background and  Government Spending on
Education  and  Health
In previous sections we have documented  the centrality of education and health to social
welfare in Indonesia, and have suggested that absent intervention  to guarantee access to
education and health services,  there would likely be serious inequalities  in education and
health outcomes. It comes as no surprise  therefore  that the government  of Indonesia  has been
active  in the education  and health sectors. In this section we provide  a brief overview  of the
institutional  background  and the magnitude of government  involvement  in these two social
sectors.
Education
Education  in Indonesia  starts with 6 years of primary school, followed  by 3 years of junior
secondary  school. Together these form basic education.  Children are required to enroll in
primary  school  by age 7. Senior secondary  school starts at age 13 and takes another  3 years to
complete.  In 1994 school attendance was made obligatory  up to the age of 15 so that basic
education became mandatory. Tertiary education is  delivered through a  wide range of
24institutions  which provide  a range of programs  ranging  from one year certificates  to four year
undergraduate  degree  programs.  These  are followed  by masters  and doctorate  programs.
Education  at all levels is delivered through  both public and private institutions  with private
education  playing  an increasingly  larger  role at each higher level of education.  At the primary
level, private education  constitutes  approximately  17 percent of enrollment  (the  main private
providers  are religious schools  serving  about 11  percent of all students  enrolled  at the primary
level) (World  Bank 1998).  At the two secondary  levels,  private schools  serve respectively  40
and 50  percent of all enrolled students.x  In higher education 66  percent of students are
enrolled in private  institutions.  In general,  private schools (except for those at the top end)
are considered  to be of lower quality than public schools.  A recent study  by the World Bank
indicates that private schools have fewer school inputs, more part-time teachers, and less
qualified  teachers in terms of certification  (World  Bank, 1998).  Unit costs at private Islamic
junior secondary  schools, for example,  are almost half those in public schools (Malo et. al,
1994).x'
Public expenditure on education constitutes approximately  2.9 percent of GDP which is
equivalent to  14 percent of the government budget (1997). The consolidated  government
budget for education  is presented  in Table A 1. The largest share of education  spending  has
been devoted to primary education (52%), followed by  18 and 13 percent for junior and
senior secondary  respectively.  Some 30 percent of expenditures  are allocated  to development
and the remainder  to recurrent spending.
Household  expenditure  on education is also substantial. The SUSENAS  household survey
records such expenditures.  Total yearly household education expenditures  according to the
1998 Module amounted to  12,400 billion rupiahx", compared to  a  total  consolidated
government budget in  1998 for education of  14,852 billion rupiah (Table A.1).  Hence,
private spending  on education  is nearly  as high as that of the government.
Health
The goal of Indonesia's  public health care system is to provide universal  primary  health care
implemented  through  a wide network of (subsidiary)  public health centers  (puskesmas)  which
provide  outpatient  services.  The network consists  of over 7100 health centers,  roughly 23,000
subscenters,  4000 mobile  clinics, and 19,000  village  maternity  homes. Over 100  of the health
centers also have limited inpatient  facilities.  On average, health centers have roughly 18 paid
staff.  In 1995, 1.1 doctor was present per center (BPS 1997). The centers are expected to
implement  some 18 programs,  which include curative  health, school health, health education,
and so on. In addition, health center staff can refer patients for treatment to 71 publicly run
class D, 214 class C, 54 class B and 4 class A hospitals, the latter being more central and
offering a wider range of services. The village midwife program (Bidan di Desa ,BDD)
launched in 1993, established access to family planning and maternity care to the village
level.
The private sector plays an important  role in the delivery of health care. According  to the
1998 SUSENAS,  52 percent to a private modern provider,  43 percent of all outpatient  visits
went to a public facility, and 4 percent to a traditional  practitioner.  40 percent of all inpatient
25visits were to private facilities.  Many of the doctors working in public facilities also keep
private practices.  Before the crisis, the trend was clearly in the direction of greater private
sector utilization. Between 1995 and  1997, the outpatient contact rate  (percent of  the
population  that visited a health facility  in the past month) increased  by 0.2 percentage  points
to 6.7 percent for the private sector whereas it dropped by 0.3 percentage points to 6.7
percent for the public sector.
Actual and realized government  health expenditures  are provided  in Table A 2. Indonesia's
government  spends around 0.5  percent of GDP on health which equals 3.5 percent of total
government  expenditures.  This is low compared  to other  countries  in the region.  For example,
Malaysia  spends 5.6 percent of government  expenditure  on health while the government  of
the Philippines spends 3.8 percent of its budget on health (World Development  Report,
World Bank, 1997).
For the purpose of this study, health budget data  have been allocated  to primary,  hospital and
routine expenditures.  In  section  4 we wish to relate  benefit incidence  to the utilization  of the
services.  Programs of which one only benefits when one attends the facility  are allocated to
the respective  facility.  Other more general programs, such as general educational  programs,
are grouped  in the "other"  category.  The exact allocation  of programs  to type of care is given
in Table 7. Table A2 in the appendix  presents the allocation  by budget  line.
Table 7 Allocation  of health programs  to primary  care, hospitals  and others
PROGRAM  Hospitals  Primary  Others
Care
Formal  Education  x
Youth  Development  x
Community  Health  Education  x
Health&Referral  services at Hospitals  X
Community  Health  Services  x
Community  Disease  Control  x
Nutrition  Improvement  x
Food and Drug  Control  x
Traditional  Medicine  Supervision  x
Women's  Role  x
Environmental  Health  in Residential  Area  x
Water Supply and Management  x
Assessment&Research  of Applied  Science  x
Information System and Development  x
National Law&Regulation Development  x
Improvement  of Infrastructure&Facilities  of Gov  x
Officials
Improvement  of Efficiency  of Gov Officials  x
Education&Training  of GovOfficials  _  x
System  Utilization  and Control  x
The health module of the 1998 SUSENAS indicates that households spend 7,833 billion
Rupiah on health per year. The module records health treatment in the past year separately
for  inpatient, outpatient, check ups and  self-treatmnent. The expanded monthly health
26expenditure  figure in the Core questionnaire,  which is collected using only one question,
yields a total household health expenditure  of 7,584 billion Rupiah.  For comparison, in
1997/1998  the government  spent 3,518  billion Rupiah  on health. Health is thus financed  to a
much greater extent  by out of pocket payments  than is education.
Regional patterns
National  budget on government  health and education  spending  do not provide information  on
regional  patterns  in public provision  of services.  Since  many  ministries  are involved  in setting
regional budgets, it is hard to obtain a good data of all public health and education  spending
at the provincial  level. For this reason we have decided to focus on input indicators as they
are reported in Table 8. Since teachers' salaries are the main budget line in the education
budget, pupil/teacher ratio's are a  good indicator for the per capita regional education
spending.  There are marked disparities  across  provinces.  Low pupil teachers ratios are found
in Yogyakarta, Bali, Central and South Kalimantan and North Sulawesi. High ratios are
found  in West Java, West Nusa Tengara and East Timor. In most provinces,  the private sector
public schools have higher pupil/teacher  ratios. For health, Table 8 shows the number of
hospital beds and health clinics per capita. The two indicators do not tell the same story. A
high concentration  of hospitals is found in North Sumatra, Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Bali and
North Sulawesi. These provinces generally  score quite good on the health output indicators
(see Table 1). A high concentration  of heath clinics is found in Bengkulu,  East Timor, South
and East Kalimantan,  SouthEast  Sulawesi  and Irian Jaya. These provinces  scored worse than
average on the child mortality indicator and around average on the child malnutrition
indicator  (table 1).
27Table 8 Regionally  disaggregated  supply  of public  education  and health facilities
Pupils  / nr of teachers  in primary  schools  hospital  beds  Health  clinics
1998/1999  /a  per 100,000  (puskesmas)
persons  (1997)  per t00,000
Province  Public  Private  Total  persons  (1997)
Aceh  23.5  23.2  23.5  49.5  5.63
North Sumatra  23.1  25.8  23.5  104.9  3.38
West Sumatra  21.2  32.4  21.5  75.3  4.49
Riau  24.5  25.3  24.5  43.5  3.37
Jambi  20.1  21.1  20.1  37.6  4.84
South Sumatra  23.6  22.2  23.5  51.7  3.65
Bengkulu  19.7  21.9  19.7  39.8  8.13
Lampung  23.2  30.6  23.5  25.2  3.01
Jakarta  24.2  21.1  23.4  162.4  3.44
West  Java  29.9  22  29.6  36.7  2.69
Central Java  22  21.1  21.9  58.2  2.77
Yogyakarta  14.7  17.1  15  122.1  4.12
East Java  19.3  19.5  19.3  51  2.76
Bali  14.9  26.2  15.1  98.5  3.76
West  Nusa  Tengara  25.3  28.6  25.3  26.7  3.03
East Nusa  Tengara  23  24.9  23.8  46.8  5.52
East Timor  25.5  22.8  25  63.9  7.67
West  Kalimantan  21.8  24.6  22  54.9  4.89
Central Kalimantan  15.4  22.5  15.5  31.6  0.75
South Kalimantan  16.3  18.6  16.4  64.3  6.27
East Kalimantan  19.9  26.4  20.2  86.8  6.01
North Sulawesi  14.5  13.9  14.4  106.2  5.09
Central  Sulawesi  18.6  24.4  18.8  62  6.3
South  Sulawesi  19.5  19.5  19.5  70  4.41
South  East  21.6  17.3  21.6  40.5  7.72
Sulawesi
Maluku  22.3  18.4  21.4  75.1  7.29
Irian  Jaya  20  20.8  20.3  77.7  8.94
Indonesia  22.3  21.8  22.3  60.6  3.35
Source:  Education  data  from Indonesian  Minsitry  of Education  web site http://www.pdk.go.id/,  health  data
from Departamen  Kesehatan  RI Pusat  Data Kesehatan  Jakarta
4.  Static  benefit  incidence  of education  and health  spending
Benefit incidence analysis describes government  spending on health and education across
income groups.  Government  spending  is viewed as an indirect transfer from the government
to the household tied to the condition that the household  uses the government  services.  The
unit transfer is calculated as total government spending divided by the number of units
consumed  by the population.  Units could be enrolment  in school, visits to a health center etc.
28The benefit incidence of the government spending to household in a  given consumption
quintile is calculated  as the total number of units consumed  by households  in that quintile
multiplied  times the unit transfer  amount.
The method has many implicit assumptions.  First, total government  spending is taken as the
benefit that the households  receive.  The value of the service  that is provided  is treated  similar
to a monetary transfer.  Of course this is not realistic. High administrative  costs, which would
make the provision  of the service  less efficient  that when provided  by the private sector, do
not change the value of implicit transfer.  In addition, it is assumed that the unit costs are the
same across all facilities. Considering  the wide disparities  in quality, it is clear that this is a
strong assumption. The quality of services in urban areas would make the unit transfers
higher. On the other  hand, the low economies  of scale for remote facilities  would increase  the
value of the unit transfer  in rural areas. More fundamentally,  a more sensible  measure of the
benefit would be the compensating  variation,  that is, the amount  households  would be willing
to give up in income in order to receive the service.  Especially  in health care, there is a risk
that households  will over consume  if services  are provided  for free at easy access.  The actual
consumption  in that case is not a good indicator  for the value that the households  attach  to the
service.
6.1 Classic  benefit incidence  analysis
Utilization of education and health  facilities
Table 9  presents gross enrollment ratios by  per  capita consumption quintile from the
SUSENAS  1998  data.xII The  high  primary  school  enrollment  ratios  across  the  income
distribution underscore the success of Indonesia in reaching universal enrollment at the
primary level. The utilization of private schools is the highest in the poorest and richest
quintiles. Private schools are very heterogeneous,  providing on the one hand, low cost, low
quality education  for children  from poor households,  and high cost, high quality education  for
children from the rich quintiles. At the secondary level, enrolment rates are higher for
children from richer quintiles. The gross enrollment ratio ranges from 55 percent for the
poorest quintile to 91 percent for the richest quintile for junior secondary education.  The
skewness  of publicly provided  junior secondary  education  is somewhat  less as children from
rich households tend to opt more often for private education. The distribution of senior
secondary  education  is even more skewed.  The gross enrollment  rate ranges from 25 for the
poor to 75 percent for the rich. Even more than for the junior secondary  level, the private
sector  utilization  is higher for children from richer  households.
29Table 9 Gross enrolment  rates by level and public/private  in 1998  (percentages)
Per capita  consumption  quintile
I (poor)  2  3  4  5 (rich)  total
Primary  Public  93.66  96.51  97.74  95.86  89.82  95.00
Private  12.02  11.24  10.66  12.60  18.70  12.60
Total  t05.69  107.75  108.41  108.47  108.52  107.59
Junior  Public  36.12  44.86  51.51  56.91  62.41  49.29
secondary
Private  18.72  22.25  25.07  27.34  29.05  24.06
Total  54.85  67.10  76.58  84.25  91.46  73.35
Senior  Public  12.56  17.64  23.33  30.72  40.65  24.96
secondary
Private  12.41  16.59  21.95  27.48  34.01  22.48
total  24.98  34.24  45.27  58.23  74.64  47.44
Source:  Author's calculations  based on 1998 Susenas  household  survey
The contact rates for primary health facilities in 1997 are presented in Table 10.  xiv The
utilization  of public primary health care facilities  is fairly evenly distributed.  About 6 percent
of the population  visited a public health clinic  in the past month. The  utilization  is the highest
for the middle quintiles.  The utilization  of (modem)  private sector  providers  is slightly  higher
than that of public facilities. The distribution  of the utilization is however rather pro-rich.
Individuals from the richest quintiles visit a private primary health care provider twice as
often as individuals  from the poorest quintiles.  Public hospitals still provide  the majority of
hospital services.  0.69 percent of the population  visited a public hospital in the past month.
Hospital  utilization,  both public and private, is pro-rich in distribution.  For public hospitals,
the contact  rate of the richest quintile  is about  3 times that of the poorest quintile.  For private
hospitals  it is about 6 times as high.
Table 10 Contact rates for primary health facilities and hospitals in 1997 (percent
of population  which visited facility  at least once  in past month)
Per capita consumption  quintile
I (poor)  2  3  4  5 (rich)  total
Primary  public  5.81  6.21  6.41  6.7  5.46  6.12
Health  private  4.14  5.31  6.13  7.27  8.85  6.34
Care  Total  9.65  11.11  12.03  13.47  13.78  12.01
Hospital  Public  0.39  0.52  0.64  0.79  1.10  0.69
Private  0.17  0.25  0.34  0.48  1.07  0.46
total  0.55  0.76  0.96  1.26  2.t4  1.13
Traditional  Health  Care 0.59  0.66  0.67  0.69  0.54  0.63
Source:  Author's calculations  based on 1998  Susenas  household  survey
Note: Public  and private  contact  rates do not add up to total because  individuals  can visit both public
and private  facilities
30Information  on the utilization  of public services  can be linked to data on public subsidies  to
calculate  the implicit indirect  transfer.  We present  data for the budgetary  year 1997/1998  and
match those with utilization  observed  in the 1998 SUSENAS.
For education, the total government  budget in 1997/1998  was 14,842 billion Rupiah (see
Table A i). The total outlays  by level of education  (using the shares of 1997)  were 7,738 for
primary, 2,629 for junior secondary and 1,901 billion Rupiah for senior secondary.  This
includes both routine and development  expenditures.  According  to the SUSENAS  1998, the
total number  of students enrolled  in public schools  was 25,168,888  for primary,  6,965,463  for
junior secondary  and 3,137,467  for senior secondary.  This results in a unit transfer  amount of
307,439 Rupiah per student per year in public primary school, 377,405 Rupiah in public
junior secondary  and 605,921 Rupiah  for a student  in public senior secondary  school.
The distribution  of government  spending  on education  is presented  in Table 11. Government
expenditures  on primary education have a pro-poor distribution.  With practically  universal
primary school enrolment, the pro-poor bias  is largely driven by  the fact that poorer
households tend to  have more young children. The share of the total transfer to  each
consumption  quintile is almost equal to the share of the population  in the relevant  age group.
The number of students from the poorest quintile in public primary schools is almost twice
the number  of children from the richest quintile.
For junior secondary education we find that most of the benefits accrue to the middle
consumption  quintiles. Here there are two effects. On the one hand, enrollment  is higher in
richer consumption  quintiles (see Table 9). On the other hand, the number  of children in the
relevant age is lower for the richer consumption quintiles. The result is  a  fairly even
distribution  of benefits across the four richest quintiles  with the households  from the poorest
quintile  reaping  a somewhat  lower 16 percent of the total transfer.
For senior secondary education,  the population shares in the relevant age groups are about
equal across the income distribution. As a result the benefit incidence results are largely
driven by differences in enrollment. Benefits are distributed very regressively. The total
transfer  to the richest quintile  is more than triple that to households  in the poorest quintile.
31Table 11  Benefit indicence  of government  education  spending  in 1998
Per capita  consumption  quintile
I (poor)  2  3  4  5 (rich)  Total
Total  population  40,119,272 40,119,272 40,119,272 40,119,272 40,119,272 200,596,360
Primary  Population  age 7- 12  6,862,229  6,200,307  5,427,431  4,765,476  3,791,548  27,046,991
percent of total  25.4  22.9  20.1  17.6  14.0  100
Public  school  students  6,250,513  5,914,599  5,220,348  4,485,724  3,297,704  25,168,888
Per capita  transfer  47,898  45,324  40,004  34,375  25,270  38,574
percent of total  24.8  23.5  20.7  17.8  13.1  100.0
Junior  Population  age 13 - 15  3,083,241  3,020,282  2,906,587  2,693,807  2,314,337  14,018,254
Secondary
percent of total  22.0  21.5  20.7  19.2  16.5  100
Public  school students  1,110,416  1,406,931  1,495,913  1,520,078  1,432,125  6,965,463
Per capita  transfer  10,446  13,235  14,072  14,299  13,472  13,105
percent of total  15.9  20.2  21.5  21.8  20.6  100
Senior  Population  age 16- 18  2,533,839  2,612,024  2,601,723  2,611,228  2,671,501  13,030,315
Secondary
percent of total  19.4  20.0  20.0  20.0  20.5  100
Public  school students  298,259  444,179  585,898  750,580  1,058,551  3,137,467
Per capita  transfer  4,505  6,708  8,849  11,336  15,987  9,477
percent of total  9.5  14.2  18.7  23.9  33.7  100
Note: Per capita  transfer is defined as the unit transfer  times the number  of students enrolled  in school divided  by
the population.  By construction,  the population  is the same  in every quintile.
Source:  Authors  calculations  based on 1998  Susenas  data and budget data  reported in Table AI  in appendix.
In health,  the  unit  of  analysis  requires  some  further  thought.  Using  the  contact  rates  as
presented in Table 10 is unsatisfactory  because it does not take account of the number of
times the individual  frequented  the service.  Health services  are also more heterogeneous  than
education services. Hospitals especially provide both in- as well as outpatient services.
Obviously,  the costs and the associated  transfer  of an inpatient  day are much higher than for
an outpatient  visit. Under the assumption  that private facilities  charge the true costs for their
services,  Pradhan and Prescott (1999) calculate  that an inpatient  day in a private hospital is
about 10 times as expensive  as an outpatient  visit to a private providerxv.  For this reason, we
choose to treat in the analysis  an inpatient day as equivalent  to 10 outpatient  visits. The unit
transfer  amount  is based on the total number  of visits.
32The total govenment health budget for 1997/1998  was 3518.3 billion million Rupiah of
which 2038.1 billion Rupiah was allocated for primary health care and 718.5 billion Rupiah
to hospital care. The remainder was allocated to programs such as health education and
training, management and support which could not be attributed to a service. The 1998
SUSENAS recorded 144 million outpatient  visits (based on the Core data with one month
recall) and 1.9 million  (based on Module  data with one year recall) inpatient  days per year at
public primary health services.  At public hospitals,  the recorded number of outpatient  visits
was 19 million and the number inpatient days 10 million. This results in a unit transfer
amount  of 7,100 Rupiah per visit in a public primary health care facility and 5,904 Rupiah
per visit in a public hospital.
Table 12 shows the distribution  of govenmment  subsidies across consumption  quintiles. For
primary  care, the bulk of the transfers is associated  with outpatient  visits. Only 11 percent of
the total transfer covers inpatient days. Outpatient visits to public primary health care
facilities  are fairly evenly  distributed  with a slight  pro-poor  bias. The same  holds for inpatient
days although  the bias is slightly  pro-rich.  The resulting  per capita transfer  is also distributed
rather evenly ranging from 10,786  Rupiah for the poorest quintile to 9,098 Rupiah for the
richest. In hospitals,  the largest share of the transfer is the result of inpatient  days. These are
distributed  very pro-rich. Individuals  from the richest quintile spend 4 times as many days in
a hospital than individuals  from the poorest quintile. The resulting  per capita transfer  ranges
from 1,825  Rupiah  for the poorest quintile  to 7,167  for the richest.
Table 12 Benefit  indicence  of govermment  health spending  in 1998
Per capita  consumption  quintile
Quintile  I (poor)  2  3  4  5 (rich)  Total
Total population  39,680,636  39,680,636  39,680,636  39,680,636  39,680,636  198,403,180
Primary  Outpatient  visits  30,683,676  30,394,428  28,992,324  30,037,044  24,618,348  144,725,820
Health  percent of total  21.2  21.0  20.0  20.8  17.0  100
Care  Inpatient  days  367,540  380,047  347,611  358,077  436,330  1,889,605
percent of total  19.5  20.1  18.4  18.9  23.1  100
Nr. of units  34,359,076  34,194,898  32,468,434  33,617,814  28,981,648  163,621,870
Per capita transfer 10,786  10,734  10,192  10,553  9,098  10,273
percent of total  21.0  20.9  19.8  20.5  17.7  100
Hospitals  Outpatient  visits  1,875,252  2,453,868  3,336,216  4,100,784  7,034,724  18,800,844
percent of total  10.0  13.1  17.7  21.8  37.4  100
Inpatient  days  1,038,834  1,108,553  2,123,689  1,905,582  4,113,913  10,290,571
percent of total  10.1  10.8  20.6  18.5  40.0  100
Nr. of units  12,263,592  13,539,398  24,573,106  23,156,604  48,173,854  121,706,554
Per capita  transfer  1,825  2,014  3,656  3,445  7,167  3,621
percent  of total  10.1  11.1  20.2  19.0  39.6  100
Source:  Authors  calculations  based on 1998  Susenas  data and budget data reported  in Table A2 in appendix.
336.2 Sensitivity  of results with respect to the economies  of scale  assumption
The benefit incidence  results for education  indicate that the number of children present in a
household is an important factor in explaining the outcome of the analysis. It seems that
poorer households tend to have more children and therefore stand to receive more of the
government subsidies linked to children (such as education). On the other hand, smaller
families contain a larger share of older people which utilize health care more often. The
positive correlation between age on morbidity was already shown in Figure 5. Table 13
provides further evidence.  Larger households  tend to have a larger share of children in the
school going age groups. Smaller household have a higher frequency of visits to medical
providers.
Table 13 Faction  of children,  average  age and health care utilization  by households  size
Househ Share  of  children  (percentage)  Average  Number  of outpatient  visits  per capita  in past month
old  age  of  (per capita)
size  7 to 12  13  to 15  16  to  household  Public  Private  Total  Traditional
18  members  (modem)
I  0.05  0.46  3.16  48.86  0.09  0.12  0.21  0.011
2  1.85  1.70  3.37  44.87  0.08  0.12  0.19  0.010
3  6.75  3.60  3.92  29.04  0.07  0.09  0.17  0.008
4  13.79  5.89  5.21  25.90  0.07  0.08  0.15  0.006
5  16.39  8.17  7.18  25.29  0.06  0.07  0.14  0.007
6  17.21  9.26  8.39  24.78  0.06  0.07  0.13  0.006
7  17.48  9.90  9.45  23.94  0.06  0.06  0.12  0.005
8  and  17.22  9.56  9.64  23.19  0.06  0.06  0.11  0.006
over
Source:  Author's calculations  based on Core of 1998  Susenas  survey.
The notion that poorer households are those with  more children is  very  sensitive to
assumptions  about economies of scale in household consumption  (Lanjouw  and Ravallion,
1995). The most common assumption,  and one we have implicitly  made so far, is that there
are no economies  of scale in consumption. Thus, a unitary household  with consumption  x is
equally well off as a household of n members with consumption n times x.  Following
Lanjouw and Ravallion (1995) we test the sensitive of the results with respect to  this
assumption by  ranking  households according to  C/n°  where  C  is  total  household
consumption,  n is the number of family members  and 0 is a parameter  between zero and one
indicating  the degree of economies  of scale in the household.""'  0 equal to one corresponds  to
the no economies of scale assumption. xvii
Benefit incidence  results under different economies  of scale assumptions  are shown in Table
14. For all education  services,  we find that the implicit subsidies  become more  pro-rich if we
assume  higher  economies  of scale. For primary education,  as 0 becomes  smaller, the implicit
transfer decreases  for the poorest two quintiles and increases for the richest three quintiles.
Nevertheless,  under all values of 0, the poorest three quintiles get most of the benefits. Thus
34the finding  that the relatively  poor are the main beneficiaries  of primary education  transfers  is
fairly robust to  alternative assumptions about the  degree of  economies of  scale  in
consumption.
This does not hold for secondary  education.  Under the zero economies of scale assumption
most of the benefits of junior  secondary education went to  the middle quintiles. The
introduction  of any economies of scale however, would indicate that the benefits are more
regressively  distributed.  With 0  at 0.6 for example,  the poorest quintile receives barely half
the benefits received  by the richest quintile.  For senior secondary  education  we find an even
more  skewed  distribution  of transfers  if economies  of scale are allowed  for.
Table 14 Sensitivity of implicit transfer of public education  and health services
with respect to economies of scale assumption  (Implicit goverrnent  transfer in
Rupiah  per capita per year)
Per equivalent  person  consumption  quintile
O  I (poor)  2  3  4  5 (rich)
Primary  1  47,898  45,324  40,004  34,375  25,270
0.8  45,311  43,380  40,240  36,371  27,570
0.6  41,139  42,671  40,497  38,527  30,037
0.4  36,750  41,332  41,964  40,218  32,607
Junior  1  10,446  13,235  14,072  14,299  13,472
Secondary 0.8  9,421  12,308  14,298  14,871  14,627
0.6  8,342  11,879  14,149  15,494  15,660
0.4  7,217  11,364  14,048  16,159  16,737
Senior  1  4,505  6,708  8,849  11,336  15,987
Secondary 0.8  3,953  5,805  8,920  11,554  17,152
0.6  3,396  5,373  8,608  11,861  18,147
0.4  3,237  4,981  8,086  12,185  18,896
Primary  1  10,785  10,734  10,192  10,553  9,097
Health  0.8  10,983  10,829  10,569  10,445  8,537
Care  0.6  11,273  11,136  10,578  9,983  8,392
0.4  11,915  11,062  10,346  9,859  8,180
Hospitals  1  1,825  2,015  3,656  3,445  7,167
0.8  1,354  2,648  3,361  3,419  7,327
0.6  1,442  2,328  3,775  3,315  7,246
0.4  1,610  2,316  3,671  3,408  7,102
Source:  Authors  calculations  based on 1998 Susenas data and budget data reported in Table Al
and A2 in appendix.
For health, however, we find that the implicit subsidies  become more pro-poor  if economies
of scale are introduced.  A likely explanation  is that health care is to a large extent consumed
by the elderly. Under the traditional assumption  of zero economies of scale, the elderly do
not tend to be highly featured in the poorest quintiles (the counterpoint  to large  households-
households with many children-highly  represented among the poor).  Allowing for some
economies of scale alters this pattern. The results are clearest for primary health care.
Whereas under the assumption of no economies of scale the poor received slightly more
benefits on a per capita basis, under the assumption  of positive economies of scale - for
35example  e equal 0.6 - the poorest quintile  receives 34 percent more than the richest quintile.
Public transfers associated with  hospital care  remain, even  under the assumption of
significant  economies  of scale,  regressively  distributed.
6.3 Public  versus  private expenditures
Out of pocket expenditures  provide a major source of financing of education and health
services. The private sector plays an important  role in the delivery of both education and
health services. These services are financed through user fees. But also public services
require household contributions. In education, households pay  registration fees, school
uniforms, equipment  and travel expenses  for their children.  Public health centers also charge
user  fees. By contrasting the  implicit transfers of  public subsidies with out-of-pocket
payments across consumption  quintiles, we obtain insight into the public/private  financing
shares  of health and education  services  across in the income distribution.
Figure 6 presents private and public expenditures  on primary education  (see Table A3 to A5
for details). The lower sections of the bars correspond with the per capita transfer amount
given in Table 10. The amounts labeled "household  public" show the per capita education
expenditures  of households  with children  in public schools.  The top sections  of the bars show
the per capita expenditures  of households  in private schools.  The figure indicates that up to
the forth quintile,  almost all education  expenditures  are in public schools.  The high utilization
of private schools in the poorest quintile  translates into only 2 percent of total financing for
the poorest quintile.  Children from richer quintiles  have higher  private spending per student
in public schools. Even though the number of children enrolled is lower in the richer
quintiles, the per capita household  contribution  increases  slightly across quintiles. The share
of government financing decreases continuously  as the households get richer. While the
government finances 82 percent of total expenditures for the children from the poorest
quintile,  it finances  only 57 percent  for children  from the richest  quintile.
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Figure 6 Public and private expenditures  on primary  education  by consumption  quintile
in 1998  (Rupiah  per capita  per year)
Figure 7 and 8 show the public private mix for  junior secondary  education  (see also Table A
4 and Table A 5 in the appendix). For junior secondary,  the number of student in public
schools was rather evenly spread across consumption  quintiles and hence so is the public
transfer. The private contributions  however, increase substantially  as the households of the
children get richer. The per capita private expenditures  of children in public schools ranges
from 5,300 Rupiah per year for children from the poorest quintile  to 14,000  Rupiah per year
for children  from the rich quintiles.  Also per capita household  expenditures  in private schools
increase  substantially as  the  households get  richer.  In  senior  secondary school,  all
expenditures  are distributed  pro-rich. Rich households  spend more in public schools,  receive
more  public transfers  and spend more in private schools.
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Figure 7 Public and private expenditures on junior secondary education by consumption
quintile  in 1998  (Rupiah  per capita  per year)
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Figure 8 Public and private  expenditures on  senior secondary education by consumption
quintile in 1998 (Rupiah per capita per year)
The  distribution of private and public expenditures on health are given in Figure 7 and 8 (see
also Table A 6 and Table A 7 in the appendix).  Both figures clearly  show the large share of
the private sector. For primary health care, public and private contributions to services
delivered in public facilities are fairly evenly distributed across the income distribution.
Richer households spend however, much larger amounts on health care delivered by the
private sector.  For hospital care all expenditure  categories  are higher for richer households.
Even though the public subsidy  is distributed  very regressively,  the importance  of the public
transfer diminishes substantially for richer households. For the richest quintile, the public
transfer  only constitutes 12 percent of total the total expenditures.  For households  from the
poorest quintile  the government  transfers  contribute  30 percent of total expenditure.
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Figure  7 Public  and  private  expenditures  on primary  health  care  by  consumption  quintile  in
1998  (Rupiah  per capita  per year)
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Figure  8 Public  and  private  expenditures  on hospitals  by consumption  quintile  in 1998  (Rupiah
per capita  per year)
6.4 Dynamic  Benefit Incidence  Analysis
Standard  benefit-incidence  analysis results are frequently  used to make inferences about the
distributional  impact  of  public  spending  reforms.  This  type  of  analysis  often  forms  the  basis
39on  which governments decide which policies to  pursue and  which not. Governments
dedicated to combating poverty may decide to increase funding for programs that have
proven to benefit the poor. This type of thinking,  however, could  be wrong. The fact that on
average the poor have benefited,  say, from public spending  on primary health care does not
necessarily  mean that an increase in spending  in this area would also go largely to the poor.
The marginal  incidence  of spending  need not equal the average incidence.
The reasons for this discrepancy  can be many. The allocation  of public spending  is typically
the outcome  of a political  process, and the distributional  impact  of a change in spending  will
therefore  depend on the abilities of different socioeconomic  groups to influence  that political
process. These abilities,  in turn, will depend  in part on the history of allocations  made under
the program at the time reforms start. For example,  suppose  that the nonpoor were able to
capture  most of the benefits when a program  was first introduced  but are now satiated on the
margin.  An expansion  of the program might then go disproportionately  to the poor, even
though an  average  incidence analysis would suggest that  the  program is  extremely
regressive. The opposite is also possible.  Suppose  that a program is originally very well
targeted to the poor because of, say, accurate means testing.  As the program expands
however,  it may become  more difficult  to carry  out the means-testing  so that the nonpoor  find
it easier to participate  in the program. The marginal  incidence  of the program  may be quite
regressive  even  though the average  incidence  results suggest  the opposite.
In the remainder  of this section  we will analyze  the dynamics  of the benefit incidence  in two
ways. First, we will compare our results with earlier studies of benefit incidence. By
presenting our results in a format comparable  to that used in earlier studies, we can observe
which groups of the population benefited from the expansion in the health and education
system over the past decades. After this discussion of historical trends we will turn to
econometric  estimates of the dynamic benefit incidence. This analysis is carried out on a
series of recent cross-sections  of the Susenas  household  survey.
Historical trends in benefit incidence
Meesok (1984,1987)  and van de Walle  (1992) analyze  benefit incidence  of social spending  in
Indonesia.  In this section we reproduce their tables, add the updated figure for 1997, and
discuss  the historical  trends.
In education  at the primary level, most of the increases in enrollment stem from the period
from 1978  to 1987. In the subsequent  decade, the school enrollment  at age 7 to 12 has only
gone up by an additional  3 percent,  reaching almost  full enrollment.  There is no history of sex
discrimination  at this level. At ages 13 to 15 there is a history of sex discrimination  although
by  1997 the differences between boys and girls had  almost disappeared. In  1978, the
boys/girls difference  still stood at 11 percentage  points. Boys' increases in enrollment  took
mostly took place two decades ago. Girls' enrollment  steadily increased over both decades.
As a result,  most of the increases in enrollment  in the last decade are a result of girls catching
up with boys. At the ages 16-18,  which corresponds  to senior secondary  school, we still find
higher enrollment rate  for boys in  1997. Boys enrollment is at 50 percent while girls
enrollment  still stands at 47 percent. There has been little improvement  in the past decade.
Boys actually  experienced  a decrease in enrollment  of 5 percentage  points. Girl's enrollment
40increased by only 2 percent point. This surprising finding for boys is not found when we
analyze  more recent trends (see later discussion),  and is therefore  questionable.  On the whole,
looking  at a span of two decades,  we find substantial  improvements  in enrollment  in the order
of about 20 percentage  points, with higher  increases  for girls than for boys.
In 1997, there is very little difference  in enrollment  rates between Java and the outer islands.
The only place where a difference of more than 1 percent point is observed is for boy's
enrollment  at age 16-18.  Java's enrollment  is in this case higher. Java has had a late start. In
1978, the enrollment in the outer islands - that is, all Indonesia  except Java - was higher
throughout.  The differences  between  the two regions disappeared  a decade  ago at the primary
level. For ages 13 to 18, the differences  only disappeared  in the last decade.
Although the urban/rural gap has narrowed, it has not disappeared to date. Even at the
primary level, enrollment  is still about 3 percentage  points higher in urban areas. At age 13-
15 the difference  between urban and rural areas is still 8 percentage points, at age 16-18 it
increases to 31 percentage points. Looking  at changes over the past two decades, however,
we find that most of the increase in enrollment  has been in the rural areas. Over a period of
two decades,  the urban rural gap narrowed  by 6 percent at the primary level, 10 percent at the
junior secondary  level, but increased  by 3 percent at the senior secondary  level. Those living
in rural areas have been the primary beneficiaries  of infrastructure  investments in primary
and junior secondary schools whereas the urban areas benefited more from the senior
secondary  school expansion.
The lower half of Table 15 presents enrolment  by quantile.  Quantiles  have  been constructed
for each year separately.  The changes  thus embody  both an income effect (people  in the same
quantile  getting richer over time) as well as a supply  effect. At the primary  level, the poor
(lower  30 percent) and middle (middle  30 percent)  income groups  have been the primary
beneficiaries  of the increase  in enrollment.  At the junior secondary  level, the increase in
enrollment  from 2 decades  ago was evenly  spread across the income groups.  In the past
decade, the increase  has been distributed  pro poor. At the senior secondary  level we find a
reversal  of the trend.  Over the period from 1978  to 1987,  the rich experienced  the largest
increases  in enrollment.  In the past decade,  the increase  has been  distributed  pro-poor.  In
1997,  the poor still lag behind  the middle income group.  The disparity exists at all levels,
even at the primary  level the poor have  not been able to catch up with the middle income
group.  In 1997,  the difference  between  the middle income group and the poor stands at 3
percentage  points at the primary  level, 11  percent at the junior secondary  level and 14  percent
at the senior secondary  level.
41Table 15 Percentage  of children enrolled  in different socio economic  groups  by age group and
sex in 1978, 1987  and 1997  (percentages)
Ages 7-12  Ages 13-15  Ages 16-18
________  _  M_  ale  Female  Male  Female  Male  Female
All  Indonesia  1997  95  96  78  77  50  47
1987  92  93  77  73  54  45
1978  84  82  59  47  34  22
ava  1997  96  96  79  77  1  47
1987  92  93  80  69  50  40
1978  83  80  57  41  30  19
Outer  Islands  1997  94  95  78  77  49  48
1987  93  93  82  79  59  53
1978  86  84  62  57  40  26
Urban  1997  98  98  89  87  70  64
1987  96  95  91  86  76  65
1978  92  88  81  67  60  40
Rural  1997  94  95  3  70  37  35
1987  91  92  73  68  44  35
1978  82  80  54  41  27  16
Per Capita consumption quantile
Lower  40 percent  1997  93  93  69  68  34  34
1987  90  90  67  62  33  24
1978  81  78  48  37  20  9
Middle  30 percent  1997  96  96  80  79  48  48
1987  93  93  79  75  54  45
1978  84  82  60  47  30  20
Upper  30 percent  1997  98  98  89  85  68  59
1987  97  97  92  87  77  64
1978  91  90  77  59  57  36
Source:  1978  figures  from O.A Meesook,  1984, 1987  figures  from van de Walle (1992)  and 1997  Susenas  data
tapes
Table 16.Presents information on the trends of the benefit incidence in the health sector. The
same degree of comparability as in Table 15, between the earlier studies and the 1997 figure,
could  not be maintained  because  of a change in the design of the Susenas  questionnaire.  In
1997, the reference period for reporting illness was extended from one week to one month.
This results in a higher  fraction  of minor, short duration,  illnesses  being recorded.  For
instance,  we find that the percentage  of individuals  reporting  sick who do not visit a provider
increases  from 1987  to 1997.  This is easily understood  in light  of the questionnaire  change.
However,  we have chosen  to still report  the 1997  figures  alongside  the figures for the earlier
period since  they  do provide some insight  into how the benefit incidence  across  income
groups  changed  over time. Also one should  be aware  that the utilization  figures reported  in
Table 16 are conditional  upon reporting  ill. This is self-reported  illness.  Over time attitudes
about  what constitutes  an illness could  change.  A common  finding  is that those who are
richer  report ill more  often. If this stylized fact carries  over to intertemportal  comparisons,  the
increase  in welfare  will have resulted in a higher  proportion  of individuals  reporting  ill while
they are healthier.  Also this will affect the observed  utilization  pattems.
42For Java, we find that the difference  in utilization  of health services  between  the poor and
rich is higher  in rural areas.  We discuss  the differences  between  the poorest  and richest 40
percent of the population.  From 1978  to 1987,  the difference  between  the poor and rich in the
percentage  of sick individuals  not seeking  health care in rural areas increased  from 13 to 15
percent  point and dropped  to 10 percent point  in 1997.  In urban areas, the poor have caught
up steadily.  While in 1978  the difference  between  the poor and rich stood  at 46 percent point.
In 1997  this had dropped  to only 5 percent  point. Over  time, the puskesmas  has taken a more
important  role in serving the poor. While in 1978  the highest  utilization  rates were still
recorded  for the middle income groups,  in 1997  the poor were the most frequent  users of
health center services  in both urban and rural  areas. Hospital  services  have always  been
distributed  very pro-rich.  There  are few changes  in this pattern  over time. Private doctors  are
also predominantly  used by the wealthier.  In rural areas the differences  between  poor and rich
increased  over time, possible as a result  of the expansion  of the public  health care system.
In the outer  islands, we find little evidence  of a catch-up  of the poor in the urban areas.  The
difference  between  the poorest  and richest  40 percent in the percentage  of ill not seeking  care
remains  at about 7 percent  point. In the rural  areas,  the patterns  are very similar  as in Java.
The difference  between  the poor and rich increased  from 1978  to 1987  and dropped  again to
1978  levels by 1997.  The use of the puskesmas  has been the highest  among  the poor and
middle income  groups in the urban areas.  In the rural areas, the rich have the highest
utilization  of the puskesmas.  This pattern has changed  little over the past decade. Private
doctors  have become  much less popular  in the rural areas over the past decade. Whereas  in
the urban areas the utilization  rates of private  doctors dropped  in the range of 8 to 18 percent
point, those in the rural areas dropped in the range from 15 to 18 percent  point. A likely
explanation  is again  the expansion  of the public health centers.  The pro-rich  distribution  of
services  from hospitals  is rather constant  over time.
43Table  16 Treatnent  of illness by region and per capita expenditure quantile in 1978, 1987
and  1997 (percent of total, based on those reporting illness in the last week for 1978 and
1987 and based on reporting illness in the past month for 1997)
Urban  Rural
Last  week's  illness  treated  by  Lower  Middle  Upper  Lower  Middle  Upper
Java  40%  20%  40%  40%  20%  40%
Self,  family  or  (no  treat)  1997  49.1  46.6  44.0  51.7  45.9  41.7
No treatment  1987  31.8  26.4  19.6  45.7  37.6  27.6
1978  58  27  12  53  41  40
Primary  health  center 1997  23.1  21.0  15.6  23.7  24.3  22.6
(puskesmas  &  1987  26.9  26.3  14.4  30.5  31.5  31.0
Auxiliarypuskesmas)  1978  19  22  15  17  37  21
Private  doctor  1997  14.1  18.6  26.6  6.5  9.7  15.8
1987  29.3  33.0  46.2  19.0  23.0  32.7
1978  13.  34  58  22  12  29
Hospital  1997  4.0  6.0  9.0  1.3  1.9  3.4
(public  &private)  1987  8.21  9.63  16.50  1.11  3.31  3.69
1978  0  14  5  1  1  7
Private  clinic  1997  1.7  1.8  2.4  0.9  0.8  1.2
1987  2.41  3.43  2.58  1.55  2.31  1.64
1978  0  0  9  1  2  0
Traditional  healer  1997  1.0  0.9  0.8  2.2  2.4  1.9
1987  1.46  1.19  0.88  2.12  2.31  3.35
1978  10  3  1  6  7  3
Outer  islands
Self,  family  or  (no  treat)  1997  46.3  42.6  38.9  46.6  43.4  37.8
No  treatment  1987  34.7  23.7  27.9  41.2  35.6  28.0
1978  33  52  26  43  39  33
Primaryhealth  center 1997  24.1  23.3  18.0  30.8  31.5  32.7
(puskesmas  &  1987  31.2  30.1  14.5  25.5  25.8  28.0
Auxiliary  puskesmas)  1978  27  10  22  11  35  23
Private  doctor  1997  11.2  15.0  24.9  2.8  4.7  9.0
1987  19.1  26.5  39.4  17.9  22.3  26.8
1978  17  27  38  15  9  25
Hospital  1997  8.0  10.5  11.4  2.2  2.7  4.8
(public  & private)  1987  9.01  14.90  14.10  3.07  4.56  5.73
1978  7  5  11  1  2  6
Private  clinic  1997  1.8  1.5  2.0  2.4  1.6  1.5
1987  2.06  2.61  1.89  4.51  3.97  5.15
1978  0  3  2  8  5  3
Traditional  healer  1997  2.5  2.2  1.6  5.0  4.7  4.8
1987  3.92  2.19  2.23  7.78  7.68  6.37
1978  13  4  1  22  10  10
Source:  1978  figures  Chernikovsky  and Meesook  (1986), 1987  figures  van de Walle (1992)  and 1997
Susenas  data  tapes
44Econometric Estimates of the Marginal Incidence of Spending
In Table 15 and Table 16 we examined  the incidence of changes in education and health
provisioning  across two periods of approximately  a decade each. Across these time periods
there has been considerable  change in the scale of government  spending on education  and
health. Scrutinizing  simple utilization  rates by quantile  across SUSENAS  surveys  of adjacent
years in the 1  990s provides  less evidence  of change,  and therefore  provides little indication  of
what might be the incidence of further expansion,  or contraction,  of education and health
provisioning  beyond current  levels
The panel data with which one could attempt to directly estimate the marginal  incidence of
program spending, are rarely available.  Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999) have recently
proposed a method to calculate the "marginal odds ratio" of participation  based on large-
sample  cross section  data. The marginal  odds ratio can be compared  to the average odds ratio
of participation from the standard incidence analysis.  We apply this  approach to  the
combined SUSENAS surveys of  1996-98. The average odds ratio is simply the quintile
specific  participation  rate in a given year t, relative  to the participation  rate in the population
as  a  whole. Participation rates for a  given quintile vary across sub-provincial regions
(kabupatens, in the case of Indonesia) according to the level of public spending on the
program in the province to which each kabupaten belongs. The marginal odds ratio for a
quintile  can be estimated  by regressing  the quintile  and year specific  participation  rate in each
kabupaten  on the province's average participation  rate in that year (including  all quintiles and
all kabupatens).  We estimate,  separately  for each of the five quintiles,  the following  model:
Ik,  p  = a +,B(Ip,,)  +SLitp96 +d96  +d97  +e,
Where q represents  .the  quintile (i=  1,.  .5), k represents  the kabupaten,  p the province and t  the
year (for t equalt either to 1996, 1997, or 1998).  Ip,  is the overall participation  rate in
province p at time t.  In order to capture the possibility  that there might be separate factors
which influence  the province-level  stance  on the desired  progressivity  of public spending  we
include the variable  Litp, 96 which is represents  the province-level  adult literacy rate in 1996.
Assuming,  as we did in the previous sections, that the subsidy rate for a given program is
constant across regions and income groups, the marginal odds ratios, represented by ,s,  is
interpreted  to indicate how an increase in public spending on that program will affect each
quintile.xvi
For the education  analysis the odds ratios are not directly  comparable  to the average benefit
incidence  results presented earlier. In the dynamic incidence analysis the enrollment  rate is
taken as the indicator of interest. It thus ignores the fact that poor families generally have
many children (when no economies of scale are assumed). For primary education for
instance,  the pro-poor  average incidence  was largely caused  by the family composition  effect
because enrollment  is virtually universal.  The adjusted average odds ratios presented in the
education  tables  take account of family composition effect by multiplying  the odds ratios
times the relative share of children in that the appropriate  age group for each quintile. In
health the results are directly comparable  because the contact rates (visits per person) of the
whole population  are analyzed.
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Table 17 Marginal  Incidence  of Public  Spending  on Primary  Education
Quintile  Net Enrollment  Average  Marginal  Odds  Adjusted  avg.  Adj.  marginal
_(percent)  Odds Ratio  Ratio  (s.e.)  odds ratio  odds ratio
I (poorest)  80.18  0.98  1.06 (0.04)  1.24  1.34
2  83.21  1.02  1.05 (0.04)  1.17  1.21
3  84.41  1.03  1.01 (0.04)  1.04  1.02
4  82.47  1.01  0.97 (0.04)  0.89  0.85
5 (richest)  76.61  0.94  1.02 (0.05)  0.65  0.71
Total  81.64  1.00  1.00
Source: Authors calculations  based  on the 1995-1998  SUSENAS  household  surveys.
The first column in Table 17 provides net enrollment  rates in public primary schooling  in
1998.  These are generally lower than the gross enrollment  rates reported in Table 2, but
display the same broadly uniform pattern across quintiles. This is reflected in the average
odds ratios which lie in a narrow band around 1.0, with the exception of the top quintile
where the distance between the participation  rate and the overall average is a bit larger.
Inferring  from these average odds ratios what would be the incidence  of a change in public
spending  on primary  schooling  would lead to the conclusion  that the impact  would  be broadly
distributionally  neutral.  However, on the basis of the marginal odds estimates in column
three, the suggestion  is that a change in public spending  on primary  education  would be most
strongly felt among the bottom two quintiles.  This pattern is consistent with the satiation
story described above - that the poor may be the most recent beneficiaries from public
spending on public schooling  and that a contraction  or expansion  of public spending  would
thus be most immediately  felt by these households.  While primary school enrollment  is not
far from being universal,  the evidence  suggests  that the poor would  be the main beneficiaries
from the final expansion  of spending  needed  to achieve  full universality.xix
Quite a  different picture emerges from an analysis of the marginal incidence of public
spending on secondary  schooling  (Table 18).  Average  participation  rates in junior secondary
schooling  increase sharply  with consumption  quintiles. However  the marginal  incidence  of a
change  in  program spending would be  somewhat less  regressive than  the  average
participation  rates would suggest. In particular, the evidence suggests that the richest two
quintiles, as well as the poorest quintile, would be relatively minor beneficiaries  from an
increase  in public spending  on junior secondary  education. An important  related observation
is that one might be mistakenly led to think on the basis of the average odds ratios that a
reduction in public spending on junior secondary  schooling  would not hit the poor hard and
would rather hit the relatively well off.  The marginal incidence analysis suggests  that this
view should  be moderated.
46Table 18 Marginal  Incidence  of Public Spending  on Junior Secondary  Education
Quintile  Net Enrollment  Average  Marginal  Odds  Adjusted  avg.  Adj. marginal
(percent)  Odds Ratio  Ratio (s.e.)  odds  ratio  odds ratio
I (poorest)  28.15  0.73  0.83 (0.07)  0.84  0.95
2  35.55  0.92  0.98 (0.07)  1.00  1.07
3  40.45  1.04  1.07 (0.07)  1.07  1.10
4  44.61  1.15  0.99 (0.07)  1.08  0.93
5 (richest)  49.45  1.28  0.78 (0.08)  1.02  0.62
Total  38.78  1.00  I  1.00
Source: Authors calculations  based on the 1995-1998  SUSENAS  household  surveys.
For senior secondary  schooling,  the marginal  incidence  analysis supports  the inference  from
average participation  rates that public spending  on senior secondary  schooling  is regressive
(Table  19).  However, the degree to which this is the case is less marked on the margin than on
average.
Table 19 Marginal  Incidence  of Public Spending  on Senior Secondary  Education
Quintile  Net Enrollment  Average Odds  Marginal  Odds  Adjusted  avg.  Adj.  marginal  odds
(percent)  Ratio  Ratio (s.e.)  odds  ratio  ratio
I (poorest)  9.84  0.50  0.67 (0.05)  0.50  0.67
2  13.92  0.70  0.90 (0.06)  0.70  0.90
3  18.75  0.95  1.05 (0.07)  0.96  1.06
4  24.32  1.23  1.12 (0.07)  1.23  1.12
5 (richest)  . 31.95  1.62  0.85 (0.08)  1.61  0.84
Total  19.75  1.00  . 1.00
Source: Authors calculations  based on the 1995-1998  SUSENAS  household surveys.
Overall, the marginal incidence analysis suggests  that "early capture" of program spending
on education  by the nonpoor is generally applicable in the Indonesia case.  Eventually, as
overall participation  rates rise with an increase in the scale of the program, satiation of the
nonpoor  sets in and the incidence  of further  expansion  becomes  increasingly  pro-poor.XX
Health
As described  in sub-section  6.  1, using contact  rates to examine  the incidence  of public health
spending is somewhat  unsatisfactory,  because these do not take into account the number of
occasions  that individuals  frequent a health center during the reference  period. We base our
estimates  of the marginal  incidence of public health spending by on the number of inpatient
and outpatient  visits per person per year. As described in section subsection  6.  1, we assume
that one inpatient day can be counted as 10 outpatient days.XXI
Table 20 Marginal  Incidence  of Public Spending  on Public Primary  Health
Quintile  Visits per person  Average  Odds Ratio I Marginal  Odds
47_  Per year  Ratio  (s.e.)
I (poorest)  1.10  0.96  0.80 (0.08)
2  1.11  0.97  1.01 (0.06)
3  1.21  1.06  1.02 (0.07)
4  1.27  1.11  0.93 (0.09)
5 (richest)  1.02  0.89  0.86 (0.11)
Total  1.14  1.00
Note: Visits include both inpatient  and outpatient  visits. One  inpatient  visit is counted  as equal  to 10  outpatient
visits.
Source: Authors  calculations  based on the 1997  SUSENAS  household  survey.
The  average  incidence  of  public  primary  health  spending.  increases  with  consumption
quintiles  up  to the  richest  quintile.  The inference  that  one  might  draw  is that  an expansion  of
public  spending  on  primary  health  care  centers  would  be  fairly  regressive,  benefiting  the  4h
quintile  the  most.  However,  based  on  our  marginal  incidence  estimates,  that  conclusion
would  seem  to  be  mistaken.  The  marginal  odds  of  participation  are  highest  for  the  2nd
quintile.  It is rather  more  difficult  to  account  for the  marginal  incidence  pattern  observed  in
Table 20 in terms  of  an  "early  capture"  story,  than  was  possible  with  respect  to education.  In
the  case  of  health  there  are  complicating  factors  associated  with,  for example,  the  propensity
of  the relatively  well-off  to self-report  more  illness,  and  that  household  spending  on health  is
a far greater  component  of total  spending  than  is the case  with  education.  xxii
Unfortunately,  perhaps  due  to  the  relatively  rare  occurrence  of  hospital  visits  in  the  data,
marginal  incidence  estimates  for hospital  care  are not  statistically  significant.
5.  Conclusions
Indonesia  is commonly  seen  as  one  of  the  important  examples  of  successful  economic
development.  This  is  not  without  reason.  Not  only  has  general  economic  growth  been
impressive  during  recent  decades,  but  Indonesia  has  also  managed  to  ensure  that  this
economic  performance  has  translated  into  remarkable  declines  in  absolute  poverty  and
substantial  improvements  in other  key  dimensions  of  human  development  such  as  education
and  health.  As recently  as  1976  two  fifths  of the Indonesian  population  lived  in poverty,  but
this  had  declined  to  just  one  in  ten  persons  by  the  mid  1990s.  During  this  same  period
primary  school  enrollment  rates  rose  from  about  60%  to  nearly  100%,  and  similar
improvements  were  documented  for secondary  and  tertiary  education.  Life  expectancy  and
infant  mortality  figures  improved  dramatically  between  the  1  970s and  1990s.
Yet  Indonesia  at  the  beginning  of  the  21st  century  faces  considerable  challenges.  The
economic  and  social  turmoil  which  beset  the  country  in  the  second  half  of  the  1990s,
following  the  financial  crisis  which  hit  most  Southeast  Asian  economies,  has  not  yet  fully
played  itself  out.  The  prospects  for  a  return  to  the  growth  path  of  the  past  remain  quite
unclear,  and  there  are  serious  concerns  that  on  the  social  front  critical  momentum  has  been
lost.  The  government's  room  for  maneuver  has  been  sharply  curtailed  as  a  result  of
significant  budgetary  constraints.
It  is  also  becoming  increasingly  clear  that  while  poverty  reduction  and  human
development  at  the  national  level  has  been  impressive,  the  country's  large  size  and  great
48geographic  heterogeneity  masks considerable  variation across provinces  and sectors. There
remain in Indonesia  pockets  of considerable  poverty. Rural areas in many  provinces,  such as
Irian Jaya, East Timor, East Nusa Tengara,  North Sulawesi, West Kalimantan,  etc., remain
afflicted by poverty rates that are double or higher the national poverty  rate in rural areas.
While poverty in urban areas is typically lower than in rural areas, provinces also vary
markedly in urban poverty levels. The general  impression  of great heterogeneity  is echoed  in
education achievements  and health outcomes. A clear challenge for the future  is to address
these spatial differences and ensure that all Indonesians are represented in the country's
social  achievements.  The wide regional disparities  also imply that each region  needs to adopt
policies in line with their stage of development,  something  that is difficult  to define solely at
the central level. Greater regional autonomy in  setting social policies seems a  fruitful
direction to take. The central coordinating  role will remain important  in defining a regional
development  strategy,  ensuring coherence  of the different  policies,  and sharing  knowledge.
In  this  paper we  have focussed on education and  health in  Indonesia, and  their
interrelationship  with poverty, with the aim of distilling lessons and delineating important
priorities for policy makers wishing  to shore up progress  achieved  to date and to confront  the
challenges  which remain. Drawing  on multiple  rounds of Indonesia's SUSENAS  household
surveys  for the mid and late 1990s,  as well as drawing on other data sources,  we documented
the reversal in the rate of decline in poverty  and slowdown  in the improvements  in the social
sectors as a result of the economic  crisis. We have shown that enrollment  rates, particularly
in junior secondary and higher education levels, are far from universal, and that health
outcomes, compared to  other countries in the Southeast Asia region, leave much to  be
desired. We have also illustrated that within the country there exists considerable  regional
variation.
While education  and health each constitute  key elements  of social welfare  with their own
intrinsic  value and  importance, there are also myriad linkages between these disparate
outcomes such that they have an instrumental influence on each other.  Measuring  the link
between,  say, education  and income, or health and income, is often very difficult,  because  the
available  data are rarely sufficient  to demonstrate  the precise causal role that these factors are
playing. Drawing  on a small number  of studies carried out in Indonesia  in recent years which
can be judged to have adequately  addressed the econometric  hurdles posed by this type of
analysis,  we have documented  the important  contribution  of education  to income. Economic
rates of return to education in Indonesia are found to be quite high, compared to other
countries,  but that with generalized  expansion  of education  outcomes  these are declining  over
time.  Empirical estimates also exist to suggest that the expansion of physical school
infrastructure is associated with higher wage rates.  While analysis of the relationship
between health and education is particularly prey to measurement problems, there exists
some evidence  for Indonesia  that good health also contributes  to higher earnings. Of course,
not only do education and health influence  earnings but they also mutually determine  each
other. Evidence  from studies in Indonesia  suggest that there is a strong impact of education,
particularly mother's  education, on  the nutritional status  of  children, and  of  parents'
education  on the education  of children.
The intrinsic and instrumental importance of education and health to social welfare
naturally prompt close government  interest in seeing educational  achievements  expand and
49health outcomes  improve. Such govermment  interest often translates into intervention  on the
grounds that education and health-care investments produce considerable externalities  in
terms of incomes  and growth,  as well as additional  indirect  effects  on themselves. Moreover,
it is often argued  that government  intervention  in education  and health is warranted  on equity
grounds - the poor are unable to provide themselves with the socially desired levels of
education  and health.  This latter contention  finds ample support in the Indonesian  context
where several careful studies document that an increase in the price of education (say a
removal of subsidized school fees) will result in a decline in the quantity of education
purchased. As found elsewhere,  price elasticities  of demand  for education  are significant  and
negative. In health, too, the evidence  suggests  that a rise in the cost of health care will result
in lower health care utilization. Initial evidence  from a carefully  designed  experiment  carried
out in Indonesia  indicates  that the decline in health demand for a given rise in the price of
health care would  be particularly  significant  among  the poor.
The case for government  intervention  in the education  and health sectors in Indonesia  is
thus quite strong. Not surprisingly,  when the institutional  structure of education  and health
care provision is examined, the public sector is found to dominate. Public expenditure  on
education,  with the public sector  dominating  at all education  levels,  represented  nearly 3% of
GDP in  1997, or  14% of the government budget.  The bulk of spending is on primary
education, but  secondary and  tertiary education are  also  important. We  find marked
disparities  in the supply of public health and education  services  across  provinces. Despite  the
large public presence in  the education sector, counterpart spending by  households on
education  nearly matches that of the government. In health, the government  spends about
0.5% of GDP per year on health, approximately  3.5%  of its budget. Here too, households  are
required  to contribute,  and in fact typically spend more than twice the amount spent by the
government on health.  The degree of  government subsidy in  education thus exceeds
considerably  the degree of subsidy of health.  Whether this balance is appropriate is an
important  question  which the paper studies  further.
Ensuring  access to health and education  for the poor thus will be a key element of a anti
poverty policy. Under stressed government  budgets this implies that price subsidies cannot
remain universal  but will need to be better targeted.  Targeted  price subsidies  have been used
in the social safety net program which was instituted  as a response to the recent economic
crisis for primary  health care and junior secondary  education.  It is too early to evaluate  their
success at this time. An alternative  policy to adopt would be a regionally focused one. In
areas where we know there is concentration  of poverty,  government  provision of health care
and education  can be more subsidized  than in areas where is less poverty. In the latter areas,
which will often be the more urbanized  ones, the private sector  can take on a more important
role. By reducing subsidies for government facilities in these areas competition will be
fostered.  Especially  in health, the private sector has been already becoming an increasingly
important  provider of services, and it is in this sector that competition  is most likely to be
successful.
Do the poor benefit from the considerable  government  presence in the education  and
health sectors which currently prevails?  This question is important in light of the equity
argument for government  intervention. In the face of the considerably  tightened  budgetary
50circumstances  of the present, government  spending on education  and health which does not
reach the poor represents  a formidable  opportunity  cost.  One of the major goals this paper
has been to study the distributional  incidence  of public spending in education and health in
Indonesia. In this paper we have opted to deflate  household consumption  for spatial cost of
living variation on the basis of a price index which has been selected to reflect not only
differences  in food prices, but which also mirrors the distribution  of welfare  defined in terms
of a range  of non-monetary  indicators  of wellbeing.
Using the traditional  benefit-incidence  analysis,  we find that public spending  in primary
education  is reasonably pro-poor. While gross enrollment  rates among  the poorest quintiles
are not markedly  higher than average, the large number of children in these quintiles ensures
that the per capita transfer share to the bottom two quintiles is slightly higher than for the
other three quintiles. In the case of junior secondary  schooling,  the per capita transfer share
is  highest among the  3rd and  4th quintiles.  For senior secondary schooling the  clear
beneficiaries have been the top two quintiles.  In the health sector, we examine public
spending  on primary health care and on hospitals. The benefit incidence  analysis  indicates  a
slight pro-poor orientation  of primary health care spending. The opposite  is clearly  the case
for public spending  on hospitals.
We have emphasized  in tlfis paper that many of the conclusions  from standard  benefit
incidence  analysis  may be premature  because of an important  implicit  assumption  which such
analysis tends to make, and which requires probing. Conclusions from benefit incidence
analysis  may not be robust to the introduction  of some allowance  for economies of scale in
consumption. An important feature of the analysis here has been to undertake sensitivity
analysis, to gauge how robust the conclusions  described above are to the introduction  of
economies  of scale in consumption.
Our evidence  suggests  that education  spending  has perhaps been rather less pro-poor (in
the case of primary education)  and more regressive  (in the case of secondary  schooling)  than
one typically is led to believe, and that primary health spending has possibly been more
progressive  than is usually supposed.  Sensitivity  analysis indicates  that the distribution  of
public spending on schooling (primary, junior secondary and senior secondary) becomes
more regressive once allowances are made for economies of scale in consumption.  If one
believes that there are significant  economies  of scale in consumption,  then public spending  on
even primary schooling  no longer seems pro-poor. And the regressiveness  of spending on
secondary schooling  becomes more accentuated.  In the case of health the opposite occurs.
With allowances for economies of scale, public subsidies  in the health sector become more
pro-poor. A likely explanation  is that health care is particularly important  to the elderly. As
economies  of scale are allowed for, the bottom  quintiles are less exclusively  made up of large
households  (i.e. households  with many children) and more of the small households  in which
the elderly often live are included among  the poor.
That the poor could potentially  benefit from  an expansion  of subsidized  primary  health care is
further confirmed when we compare the overall share of spending on health by the public
sector compared to households themselves.  As we have noted above, even in publicly
provided health care centers, households  are obliged to incur considerable  expenses. At the
aggregate  level, households  in Indonesia  spend many  times over what the government  spends
51on health. At  all income levels there is plenty of scope for substitution of  household
contributions  with government  transfers.  It is clear that the poor are particularly  badly placed
to incur the necessary  private expenditures  to obtain the healthcare  treatment  that they need.
On the other hand, the small share of public expenditures  in total health expenditures  for the
rich indicates  that reducing  those expenditures  will make little difference  to them. The case is
most striking for  government  hospitals.  The benefit incidence  of government expenditures
for this category is very pro-rich while the share of government  expenditures  as a percent of
total is very small. There seems  no compelling  reason to maintain  these universal  subsidies  in
the present  form.
In education  the government  bears the largest burden of the expenditures.  Here there is
little scope for substitution  and as a result additional  spending  should be aimed at increasing
enrollment  and/or  enhancing  quality.  Private schools  cannot be ignored  in such a policy since
a substantial  fraction of the poorest  children are enrolled in primary  private religious  schools,
often  of dubious  quality.
To recap so far, our analysis suggests that the poor have generally benefited from
government  subsidies in primary health care. However,  the evidence  on household  spending
suggests  that the subsidies are only a small fraction of total costs - so that the poor are still
left to pay a significant  amount. In the case of education,  the evidence  seems to suggest that
the poor have not been the principal  beneficiaries  of public spending. Moreover,  the actual
government  transfers in education  are orders of magnitude  higher than for health. It would
seem that a case could be made for recommending  an increase in government  spending on
health, possibly  financed  by a reduction  in education  subsidies  at the post-basic  level.
However,  we have shown in this paper  that before such a recommendation  is offered  it is
necessary to consider the distributional  impact of changes in government spending, not
simply the current average incidence  of government  spending. We started by taking a long
view, and asking what has been the incidence  of government  education  and health spending
between 1978, 1987 and 1997. The evidence indicates  that the poor benefited  considerably
from the expansion of government spending on primary education throughout  the period.
The expansion  of junior secondary  and senior secondary  education  became  increasingly  pro-
poor in the decade  between 1987  and 1997.  This picture suggests  that the nonpoor have been
able to enjoy  "early capture" of education  subsidies  but that over time expansion  of education
spending goes disproportionately  to the poor. The expansion  also allowed girls to catch up
with boys virtually  eliminating  the sex  bias at present.
On the health side, the evidence  is rather more difficult  to compare over this long period.
However the tentative picture is also consistent  with a marginal incidence of spending on
primary health which is pro-poor; while the non-poor  may be the early beneficiaries  of this
spending, expansion benefits the poor rather more (and contraction would hurt the poor
disproportionately). In the case of hospitals, the evidence is stronger that the poor are not
major beneficiaries  throughout  the period.
Does the general impression of the marginal incidence of spending across decades
provide a good indication of the incidence of changes in government spending at a given
point during the late 1990s? While multiple rounds  of SUSENAS  data are available for the
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period, and thus little change in the incidence  of this spending at a national level from one
year to  the next.  We employ recent econometric techniques which exploit the spatial
variation in the incidence of spending across districts and provinces to probe the above
question. The results supported  the suggestion  from the historical  analysis  that the marginal
incidence  of primary  education  spending  is pro-poor. This conclusion  is somewhat  weaker  in
the case of junior secondary  and secondary  schooling,  but in all cases the evidence suggests
the marginal  incidence  is less regressive  than what one might think by just looking  at average
incidence figures.  The overall impression is that changes in  government spending on
education  would not leave the poor unaffected. If the changes  concern  primary education,  the
poor would be particularly  hard hit (positively  in the event of an expansion,  negatively  in the
event of a reduction).
Our econometric  approach  to estimating  the incidence of health spending  suggests,  once
again consistent  with the historical  analysis,  that changes  in government spending  on public
primary  health would not leave the poor unaffected. The evidence  here, too, is that increases
in public spending  on primary health care centers  would benefit  the poor considerably.
To summarize,  our dynamic analysis of the incidence of government spending on
education  has yielded the important  insight that the choices  facing  the Indonesian  government
on the allocation of spending across education sectors is less neat than one might have
thought at first glance.  Static benefit incidence analysis might have suggested that further
expansion of primary and possibly junior secondary schooling, could be  financed by a
reduction of  subsidies for secondary schooling, with only minor impact on  the poor.
However, the marginal incidence analysis suggests that removal of secondary subsidies
would also affect the poor. We have suggested  that in all education  sectors, the non-poor  are
generally  aliong the first to benefit from government  spending,  but that as this spending  has
continued and expanded the poor have come to benefit from these subsidies as well.
Removing subsidies from one education sub-sector to finance further subsidies in another
sub-sector is likely to produce both winners and losers among the poor. The results also
imply that a policy aimed at improving  the quality of the existing providers (for example  by
providing better textbooks) will be more pro rich than a policy that aims at expanding  the
supply of education  (by building new schools).  For the latter the marginal  benefit incidence  is
the appropriate  result  to look at while for the former  the average incidence  is relevant.
Our analysis  has also suggested  that while there seems to be an unambiguous  case for
further expansion of  primary health  care  spending in  poor  areas  by  the  Indonesian
government,  it is not at all obvious that this should be financed, even only in part, by a
reduction in education spending.  Once again, the marginal incidence analysis which has
shown that the poor are beneficiaries of government spending on primary but also junior
secondary  and secondary  education,  indicates  that shifting  resources out of education  (at least
secondary  levels and lower) would create losers among the poor, although it also seems clear
that that poor would benefit from lower health care costs.  A more compelling direction  to
take, if it truly proves impossible to increase health spending out of general government
revenues, would be  to shift health spending out of hospitals and toward primary health
centers.
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56Table A 1 Consolidated  budget  for education  from 1984 to 1997
5.1.1  Education  1984/  1985/  1986/  1987/  1988/  1989/  1990/  1991/  1992/  1993/  1994/  1995/  1996/  1997/
1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
Total consolidated education expenditure  2,914  4,010  3,724  4,041  4,445  4,927  5,845  6,730  8,325  9,542  10,885  12,702  14,649  14,852
(in billion Rupiah)  _  _  _  _  _  .-
Education expenditure/GDP (perc)  3.2  4.1  3.6  3,2  3.0  2.7  2.8  2.7  3.0  2.9  2.9  2.8  2.8  2.9
Education expenditure/government  15.0  17.6  17.0  15.0  13.5  12.9  11.8  12.9  14.3  14.8  15.1  15.4  15.7  14.1
expenditure (perc)  I_ 
Education expenditure primary education/  58.2  52.7  55.8  48.1  49.4  43.4  51.6  50.1  50.2  52.6  52.0  52.1
Education expenditure (perc) 
_  _
Education expenditure junior secondary  14.4  17.3  13.2  12.7  12.2  13.3  13.3  13.9  13.6  16.5  17.0  17.7
education/ Education expenditure (perc)  _  _  _
Education expenditure senior secondary  11.6  12.9  11.3  15.8  15.9  17.1  13.0  13.8  13.1  13.8  12.8  12.8
education/  Education expenditure (perc)  I_I_I_I
Education expenditure higher education/  9.2  11.0  13.3  16.4  16.0  18.1  13.4  12.5  13.8  10.4  11.4  11.4
Education  expenditure (perc)  I_I
Routine education expenditure/Education  60.1  61.4  71.1  72.4  74.6  71.5  73.2  69.6  69.4  66.6  69.6  70.3  69.2  71.2
expenditure  (perc)
Development education  39.9  38.6  28.9  27.6  25.4  28.5  26.8  30.4  30.6  33.4  30.4  29.7  30.8  28.8
expenditure/Education  expenditure (perc)  _  I  I__  _I  I_I_--  I  _
Notes:  Shares of primary, secondary and Higher do not add up to 100 because not government expenditures that could not be attributed to these categories  are not
included
Figures present realized expenditures upto 1992/1993. After that allocated expenditures are reported.
Source: World Bank (1998)
57Table  A 2 Consolidated  government  budget for health from 1994  to 1998  by type of care and source of funding (billion  Rupiah,  current prices)
1994/95  l  1995/96  l  1996/97  1997/98  j  - 1998199
SOURCE  Hosp I PCare I  Others  | Total | Hosp I PCare I  Others Total | Hosp  PCare Others  I Total  Hosp | PCare  Others Total rHosp  PCare Others Total
Routine  482.11172.81 416.3  [2071.2  567.9 1316.9  556.9 2441.  695.3 1625.7  578.212899.2. 718.512038.11  761.7 3518.3 1530.3  2957.61  706.915194.8
DIK-Non  Salary  90.4  16.5  48.1  155.0  102.9  23.5  62.3  188.7  115.1  26.2  69.9  211.2  133.5  34.2  89.8  257.5  35.0  67.0  194.3  296.3
/a  I_  _  _  __  _  _
DIK-Salary/a  124.9  87  215.9  427.8  144.5  125.1  306  575.6  179  158.5  256.2  593.7| 237.3  314.3  397.1  948.7  277.8  320.7  235.2  833.7
DIK-S  /a  61.4  0.5  15.9  77.8  75.2  0.9  23.8  99.9  69.2  0.5  28.9  98.6  0.7  72.4  27.3  100.4  63  3.6  42.4  109
SBBO/b  12.2  12.2  32.9  32.9  31.6  - 31.6  24.8  |  24.8  73  73
SDO/c  443  443  532.6  532.6  624.7  624.7  738.8  738.8  871.7  871.7
Development  budget  l  _  l  1  1  1  1  1
DIP/d  1  111.2|  191.8  69.6  372.6  113.9  218.8  72.1  404.8  130.2  261.6  71.7  463.5  200.2  289.2  84.7  574.1  331.6|  566  76.9  974.5
OPRS  /e  50.8  =  50.8  52.7  52.7  50.9  =  50.9  l  l/l
BLN/f  1 31.21  92.7  14.8  138.7  45.8  73  14.7  133.5  119.3  136.3  34.51 290.1  1221 129.1  15.1  266.2  749.91 407.7  33.1  1191
INPRES/h  _  |_341.3  52  393.3  343  78  421  417.9  1171 534.9  460.1|  147.71  607.8  720.9  125  845.9
/a Operation  maintenance,  salaries, medicines  consumables,  replacement  equipment  and expandable  supplies,  /b non salary  expenditures  (excl drugs)  in provincial
and district  hospitals  /c personal  component  covering  salaries  of regional  staff  /d allocated  to regions for all public hospitals  for equipment  procurement,  hospital
construction,  training  and other  hospital  investments  /e building renovation  equipment  maintenance  and additional  consumables  or medicines  for all public  hospitals
If foreign  aid /g there is aid-funding  in the amount  of Rp.667.9  bn which has not been  included here because  this amount  is not recorded  at Ministry  of Health.  Rp.
218.5  bn is in the form of raw material  for drugs from Japan, Rp. 449.4  is emergency  grant  for subsidizing  foreign  exchange  rate in importing  drugs.  /h grant  finance
for health center construction  .and subsidy for some operating  costs.
1994/1995  1995/1996  1996/1997  1997/1998  1998/1999
Total consolidated health expenditure  (in billion  2071.2  2441.7  2899.2  3518.3  5194.8
Rupiah)
Heath  expenditure/GDP  (perc)  0.54,  0.54  0.55  0.50  0.67
Health  expenditure/government  expenditure  (perc)  2.9  3.0  3.1  3.5  3.5
Primary  health  care expenditure/  total health  56.6  73.3  157.3  102.0  53.9
expenditure  (perc)  l  l_l_l  _  l  __l
Hospital  expenditure/total  health expenditure  (perc)  23.3  206.5  31.6  371.9  23.3
Non attributable expenditure/total health expenditure  20.1  364.7  43.1  236.5  22.8
(perc)  I  ,  I_I_I  _  I_I
Source:  Calculated  from data provided  by department  of health and ministry  of finance.  Budget data  are updated  from Saadah Lieberman  and Juwono  (1999).  The
reported  figures  exclude  provincial  and district  budgets.
58Table A 3 Private and public spending  on primary education  (Rupiah  per capita  per
year)
Primary
Quintile  Public  expenditure  HH public  HH private
I (poorest)  47,898  9,220  1,346
2  45,324  10,366  1,374
3  40,004  10,617  1,587
4  34,375  11,257  2,552
5 (richest)  25,270  12,494  6,605
80
Table A 4 Private and public spending  on junior secondary  education  (Rupiah  per
capita  per year)
Junior  Seco dary
Quintile  Public  expenditure  HH public  HH private
I (poorest)  10,446  5,298  2,822
2  13,235  7,798  3,639
3  14,072  9,048  4,698
4  14,299  10,513  5,891
5  (richest)  13,472  14,073  8,993
Table A 5 Private  and public spending  on senior secondary  education  (Rupiah  per
capita  per year)
Senior Secondary
Quintile  Public  expenditure  HH public  HH private
I (poorest)  4505  2639  3065
2  6708  4344  5156
3  8849  6509  7840
4  11336  9190  11357
5 (richest)  15987  16500  18525
Table  A 6 Private  and public spending  on primary  health care (Rupiah  per capita  per
year)
Primary Health Care
Quintile  Public  expenditure  HH public HH private
I (poorest)  10,786  2392  6415
2  10,734  2514  10602
3  10,192  2744  13021
4  10,553  4211  19000
5 (richest)  9,098  3148  31173
59Table A 7 Private and public spending on hospitals (Rupiah per capita per year)
Hospitals
Quintile  Public  expenditure  HH public  HH private
I (poorest)  1,825  2911  1140
2  2,014  4514  4496
3  3,656  4952  4479
4  3,445  8386  6521
5 (richest)  7,167  18381  32616
Table A 8:  Marginal Incidence of Public Spending on Primary Education
Quintile  Marginal  Odds  Marginal  Odds  Marginal  Odds
0=1  0=0.8  0=0.6
I (poorest)  1.06  1.08  1.07
2  1.05  1.05  1.05
3  1.01  1.00  0.99
4  0.97  0.98  1.01
5 (richest)  1.02  1.02  1.02
Source: Authors  calculations  based on the 1995-1998  SUSENAS  household  surveys.
Table A 9:  Marginal Incidence of Public Spending on Junior Secondary Education
Quintile  Marginal  Odds  Marginal  Odds  Marginal  Odds
_______  _  0=1  8=0.8  0=0.6
l  (poorest)  0.83  0.79  0.78
2  0.98  0.98  0.98
3  1.07  1.06  1.02
4  0.99  0.98  1.07
5 (richest)  0.78  1  0.84  0.80
Source: Authors  calculations  based  on the 1995-1998  SUSENAS  household  surveys.
60Table A  10: Marginal Incidence of Public Spending on Senior Secondary Education
Quintile  Marginal  Odds  Marginal  Odds  Marginal  Odds
0=1  0=0.8  0=0.6
I (poorest)  0.67  0.68  0.71
2  0.90  0.85  0.85
3  1.05  0.98  0.95
4  1.12  1.11  1.09
5 (richest)  0.85  0.87  0.86
Source: Authors  calculations  based  on the 1995-1998  SUSENAS  household  surveys.
Table A 11: Marginal Incidence of Public Spending on Primary Health Centers
Quintile  Marginal  Odds  Marginal  Odds  Marginal  Odds
0=1  0=0.8  0=0.6
1 (  oorest)  0.80  0.76  0.84
2  1.01  1.09  1.02
3  1.02  0.93  0.94
4  0.93  0.91  0.97
5 (richest)  0.86  0.86  0.80
Source: Authors  calculations  based on the 1995-1998  SUSENAS  household  surveys.
i(1) Vrije  Universiteit  Amsterdam,  (2) World  Bank. We are grateful  to Jenny Lanjouw,  Christian
Morisson,  Dominique  van de Walle, and participants  at two workshops  held at the OECD,  Paris,  in the
spring  of 1999  and 2000,  for useful comments  and suggestions. The views in this paper are those of
the authors and should  not be taken to reflect  the views of the World  Bank or any of its affiliates.
Melanie  Juwono  provided  indispensable  inputs and assistance.
Public  primary  health care includes health centers,  subsidiary  health centers,  Polindes and Posyandu.
Private  primary  health care  represents  private  doctors,  clinics  and paramedical  practitioners  (Petugas).
ii From  web site bureau of Statistics  Indonesia  - http://www.bns.Ro.id
iv A major difference  between the official  poverty  lines,  based on the "Food  energy" method,  and the
"Cost of Basic Needs" lines  which have been developed  by Bidani  and Ravallion  (1993)  is that the
former allow poverty  lines  to differ across provinces  as a consequence  of varying  food prices as well as
a varying  food basket. The latter approach  holds  the food basket constant  and allows only price
differences  to drive  differences in the poverty  lines. An additional  difference  in the two approaches  is
in the source of the price information  used to value  the food basket(s)  (for further details  see Chesher,
1998,  and Bidani  and Ravallion, 1993).
v  We construct  two measures  of "real" consumption  based, respectively,  on the price indices arising out
of the official  poverty  lines, and the altemative  poverty  lines. Real per capita consumption  is defined as
C  =  C-R  where C is per capita  consumption,  PLR  is the poverty  line for region  R and PL is the
national  poverty  line. The national  poverty  line is the population  weighted  mean of the regional  poverty
lines.
v Child mortality  is calculated  using  the indirect  method  based on the number  children  bom and
number  of children  that died recorded  in Susenas 1996.  The child mortality  rate is calculates  using  a
UN developed  program  QFIVE.  The method is described  in United Nations  (1990).
vii Malnutrition  is defined using  the ratio of a child's weight,  measured in kilograms,  to the child's age,
measured  in months. Weight for age measurements  are compared  to intemational  standards,  using the
reference  growth  curves developed  by the U.S. National  Center  for Health  Statistics  (NCHS)  and
recommended  for international  use by the World Health  Organization  (WHO).  Those who have a
weight  for age which falls in the lowest  51'  percentile  of the US distribution  are considered
malnourished.  This indicator  is based  on the Susenas 1998.
61"i"  For further  details on the FGT class of poverty  measures,  see Foster,  Greer and Thorbecke  (1984)
ix Dreze and Sen (1995) provide  an insightful  discussion  of the intrinsic  and instrumental  roles of
education  and health in the context  of Indian  development.
x  These  private  enrollment  percentages  differ from  those derived  from SUSENAS  (used  throughout  the
paper)  due to the fact that the former is derived  from an establishment  survey  (GOI's annual  survey  of
schools). It is expected  that household  surveys  yield  different data  from establishment  surveys  at any
one point in time. The  two data series  however  show similar  trends over  time in enrollment,
public/private  participation  etc.
xi For more information  on Indonesia's  education  system, see World  Bank 1998.
xii  The Core of the 1998  SUSENAS  collects  education  expenditure  using  a single  question.  Expanding
this figure  to the national level yields  to a household  education  expenditure  of 8,280  billion Rupiah.
x,,, Gross enrolment  rates differ from net rates in that in the latter  only children  of a given age group
who are enrolled  in, say, primary  school  are related to the total number  of children  in that age group.
In the case of gross enrolment  rates, persons  in other  age groups  who happen  to be enrolled  in primary
school are also included in the numerator  which is compared  to the denominator  of all children  in a
given age group.
xiv  As a result of a change in the questionnaire  design  we cannot  calculate  the contact  rate for inpatient
services  in the past month  in 1998.  The contact  rate reported  in Table  9 includes both  in and outpatient
services.  We therefore  report  figures  for 1997.
xv  According  to Module of the 1995  SUSENAS,  the average out of pocket  payments  for a outpatient
visit to a private  provider  were 11,063  Rupiah  while the average out of pocket  payments  for an
inpatient  day in a private hospital  was 114,474  Rupiah.
XVI  See Coulter  et al, 1988,  and Deaton  and Paxson, 1998,  for further discussion.  At present  no widely
accepted  method exists  with which to estimate such economies  of scale in consumption  (see Lanjouw
and Ravallion, 1995,  and Deaton  and Paxson, 1998,  for further discussion). However,  it is increasingly
recognised  that the implicit assumption  of zero economies  of scale is not tenable.
xi  Assumptions  about economies  of scale  in consumption  are  just one of many  that underlie  any
distributional  analysis based  on quantitative  data.  However,  they have received  relatively  little attention
in the literature  to date. Moreover,  there are grounds  for being particularly  alert to the issue in the
context of benefit  incidence  analysis,  as opposed  to in poverty  studies  more generally. This is because
many public transfers  (such as education  and health subsidies,  but also public pensions)  implicitly
target individuals  from households  which vary in size in a systematic  way. For example,  pensioners
and the infirm  often  tend to reside in small  households,  while children  typically  reside in large
households. As a result,  the choice  of how benefit incidence  analysis  is conducted  can, in principle,
have a direct bearing  on the kind  of conclusions  which result.
Xviii  Because  kabupaten  and quintile  specific  participation  rates are implicitly  included  when calculating
the province's overall  mean participation  rate (on the right hand side), OLS  will give a biased  estimate
of the marginal  odds of participation.  Because  we have  data for multiple  years we are able to calculate
participation  rates for 1995  through 1998. We instrument  the average  participation  for a given
province  in year t with the participation  rate for t-1  . For each program  separately,  we estimate  five
two-stage  least squares models,  one for each quintile,  of kabupaten  specific  participation  rates on
province overall  participation  rates. There are 27 provinces  and a total of 306 kabupatens  in the
dataset. We have checked  to see whether  employing  leave  out mean  province  level participation  rates
as instruments  (as in Lanjouw  and Ravallion,  1999)  leads  to different  results. The broad findings  are
the same, but  this latter instrument  performs  less satisfactorily  due to some individual  kabupatens
representing  a sizeable  fraction  of the total province-level  population.
xix  Although  the individual  marginal  odds  estimates  are statistically  significant,  the standard  errors  are
large enough  to prevent  many of the comparisons  of marginal  odds  ratios across quintiles  from being
statistically  significant. The evidence  based  on the econometric  analysis  described  here should  thus be
interpreted  cautiously,  and is best viewed  as a complement  to the longer-term  historical  analysis
reported earlier.
xx  We checked  whether our assessments  of the marginal  incidence  of public  spending  change when we
allow for  economies  of scale in consumption. While we saw that on average  public spending  in
education  becomes  more regressive  as we allow for economies  of scale in consumption,  the marginal
incidence  of these  programs  proves  to be remarkably  stable. Appendix  tables A.08-A.10  provide
details.
xxI Our estimation  for the marginal  incidence  of health spending  are based on the 1995-1997  surveys
only. In addition,  the regression  models  excludes  the undernutrition  variable  due to
62xXii  Sensitivity  analysis  on the basis of economies  of scale in consumption  to support  the notion  that
increasing  spending  on primary  health is pro-poor  for moderate  economies  of scale, but that this then
declines  again  as more extreme  economies  of scale  are assumed  (see Table  A. 11).
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